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THE STATE OF EXACTIONS
ABSTRACT
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the
Supreme Court slightly expanded the range of land use permitting
situations in which heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in a
constitutional “exaction” takings case. In crafting a vision of regu-
lators as strategic extortionists of private property interests, though,
Koontz prompted many takings observers to predict that the case
would provide momentum for a more significant expansion of such
scrutiny in takings cases involving land use permit conditions mov-
ing forward, and perhaps even an extension into other regulatory
contexts, as well.
Five years on, this Article evaluates the extent to which those pre-
dictions have come to pass via a review of the approximately 130
lower court cases to have cited Koontz to date. Based on this review,
the Article offers two claims. First, on doctrinal grounds, it contends
that Koontz’s footprint thus far is rather light, in the sense that the
decision has not prompted lower courts to extend the application of
heightened scrutiny to a broad class of regulatory measures and, in
those select instances where such scrutiny does apply, has not led
lower courts to craft a far-reaching array of remedies. Second, on
normative grounds, it asserts that the restraint evident in the lower
court opinions that have wrestled with Koontz is appealing in the
sense that this course acknowledges that property necessarily
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involves context-driven allocative choices by the state, and focuses—
as best these courts can, given the constraints explicit in prior
doctrine—on whether those allocative choices are fair and just absent
compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the conveniently rhyming cases of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard more than two decades ago,
the Supreme Court declared that in order to avoid having to pay
takings compensation, the state, as the defendant, shoulders the
burden of proving that certain conditions, or “exactions,” attached
to land use permits are qualitatively and quantitatively commensu-
rate with the proposed development’s impacts.1 In its 2013 decision
in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court
slightly expanded the range of circumstances to which this demand-
ing standard applies.2 Of potentially far more significance than this
minor, affirmative doctrinal step, though, was the rhetoric on the
state’s role in allocating property interests that accompanied it.
In crafting a vision of regulators as strategic extortionists of pri-
vate property interests, Koontz prompted many takings observers
to predict that the case would provide momentum for a more signif-
icant expansion of such scrutiny in takings cases involving land use
permit conditions moving forward, and perhaps even an extension
into other regulatory contexts, as well. Some observers exalted at
this possibility on the view that it would reflect long overdue pro-
tection of individuals’ freedom to use their land without fear of the
state extracting concessions or changing the rules mid-game.3
Others, though, expressed deep concern that Koontz would set off a
chain reaction of takings cases that routinely put a stringent burden
on the state to defend adjustments to existing property allocations,
1. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“rough proportionality”); Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“essential nexus”).
2. 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental
Regulation, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 767 (2013); Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion
and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1, 30-31 (2014) [hereinafter Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion];
Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz,
Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
215, 216; Sophia M. Stadnyk, A Fistful of Dollars—Exactions and Extortion, 65 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L. 4, 5 (2013); Luke A. Wake & Jarod M. Bona, Legislative Exactions After Koontz v.
St. Johns River Management District, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 581-83 (2015).
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even as social, economic, and moral perspectives on the values that
property serves evolve over time.4
To get a status-check on these prospects five years on, this Article
reflects the author’s review of each of the nearly 130 cases to have
cited Koontz through July of 2018. In the course thereof, the
Article offers two contentions. First, on doctrinal grounds, it con-
tends that Koontz’s footprint is thus far rather light.5 The decision
has not prompted lower courts to extend the heightened scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan to a broad class of regulatory measures and, in
those select instances where such scrutiny does apply, the lower
courts have not crafted expansive remedies.6 Second, on normative
grounds, this Article asserts that the restraint evident in the lower
court opinions that have wrestled with Koontz thus far is appealing
in the sense that it acknowledges that property necessarily involves
context-driven allocative choices by the state, and focuses—as best
these courts can, given the constraints explicit in Nollan and
Dolan—on whether those allocative choices are fair and just absent
compensation.7
Part I outlines the problematic foundations of exaction takings
law in an effort to delineate the confines within which the lower
courts must operate in interpreting Koontz’s bearing on a number
4. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 49-50 (2014) (suggesting that the Koontz majority may believe that its
holding “will logically fit” within a more stringent version of takings doctrine that has “yet to
be developed”); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 287, 288 (“[T]he Court has left the domain of ... heightened scrutiny wholly undefined.
Indeed, the Koontz majority eschewed any boundary principle that would hive off its exactions
jurisprudence from its land use jurisprudence more generally.... [T]he Court has left land use
regulation vulnerable to the creeping expansion of heightened scrutiny under the auspices of
its exactions jurisprudence.”); Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise
Adaptation Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 186-89 (2013) (“Before the
Koontz decision, the imposition of coastal impact fees for all permitted development located
in the [path of sea-level rise] would have been situated comfortably at the moderate risk level.
However, if state and lower federal courts ambitiously apply the Supreme Court’s ruling[,]
such fees could prove problematic for coastal regulators.”); Michael Allan Wolf, The Brooding
Omnipresence of Regulatory Takings: Urban Origins and Effects, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1835,
1857-58 (2013) (contending that the “property-rights friendly decision in Koontz ... will most
likely [lead to] dramatically expanded application[s] of Nollan and Dolan”).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
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of critical takings issues that are the central focus of the Parts that
follow.
Part II unpacks the lower courts’ choices on four specific issues to
evaluate whether the projections made on these issues in Koontz’s
immediate wake have come to pass. These issues include whether
courts would interpret broadly the class of monetary impositions
that are subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny;8 whether courts
would extend Nollan and Dolan to permit conditions imposed not
only through individualized administrative decisions but also to
those imposed via broadly applicable legislation;9 whether courts
would interpret broadly the class of proposed conditions deemed
“concrete and specific” enough to implicate Nollan and Dolan;10 and
whether courts would expand the remedies available to successful
exaction takings claimants.11
Part III addresses the lower courts’ course relating to a more am-
bitious projection that select scholars offered on a fifth issue in
Koontz’s immediate wake, namely that courts would extend Nollan
and Dolan scrutiny outside the permit conditions context altogether
and into government contracts and other more traditional realms of
regulatory takings law.
Part IV concludes that the lower courts in most instances have
not seen Koontz as a launching pad to curtail the state’s broad au-
thority to regulate land uses absent compensation.12 Fortunately,
the cases that have cited Koontz to date do little to interfere with
the state’s flexibility to draw on its suite of regulatory tools to en-
sure that property rights are not exercised in ways that harm either
the legitimate property and personal rights of others, or the eco-
nomic and social infrastructure that facilitates wide dispersal of the
advantages of the property system.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. The leading case recognizing such regulatory flexibility is Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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I. FOUNDATIONS: KOONTZ AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.”13 This limitation originally applied only to physical appro-
priations resulting from governmental conduct.14 More recently,
however, courts also have interpreted the Takings Clause to require
that the state pay compensation when a regulatory decision reallo-
cates property interests in a manner that is markedly unfair and
unjust to an individual property owner absent such payment.15
Among these cases are those in which claimants allege that condi-
tions attached to land use development permits amount to unconsti-
tutional exactions absent the payment of just compensation. The
2013 Supreme Court matter of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District involved one such “exaction taking” claim.16
Over the course of two Sections, this Part lays the groundwork for
the doctrinal and normative claims that follow in the remainder of
the Article. The first of these Sections provides an outline of the
dispute in Koontz, as well as a synopsis of the Court’s resolution
thereof. The second Section offers a summary critique of exaction
takings law and, specifically, the Koontz Court’s situating this body
of law within the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The prob-
lematic foundations of exaction takings law described in this Part
set the contours within which the lower courts must operate in in-
terpreting Koontz’s bearing on the outstanding takings issues—
involving monetary impositions, exactions and other regulatory
measures devised through legislation, the requisite concreteness
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (“Prior to Justice
Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, ... it was generally thought that the
Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, ... or the functional equi-
valent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’” (first citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922); then quoting Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870); and
then quoting Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879))). For an exhaustive study on the
original meaning of the Takings Clause, see generally William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
15. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 48-49 (1960); Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
16. 570 U.S. 595, 601-02 (2013).
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and specificity of demands, and the available remedies—that are the
central focus of the Article’s remaining Parts.
A. A Precis on Koontz
In the early 1990s, Coy Koontz decided that he wanted to
construct a commercial shopping center on an undeveloped 14.2-acre
lot that he had purchased two decades prior.17 Koontz needed to
secure a discretionary permit from the regional Water Management
District given that nearly all of his tract lay within a hydrologic
basin protected under Florida environmental law.18 Construction of
the shopping center would require the destruction of 3.4 acres of
protected wetlands and 0.3 acres of protected uplands.19
In his application, Koontz offered to “mitigate” the wetland loss
by preserving the remaining undeveloped portion of his property in
its natural state through a conservation easement.20 The District
found Koontz’s self-proposed mitigating condition inadequate, for
Florida law is premised on avoiding net wetland loss.21 While the
District could have exercised its authority to deny Koontz’s applica-
tion outright at that point, it instead identified several possible
conditions—including reducing the size of his development or fund-
ing offsite wetland improvements—that, if accepted by Koontz,
could allow for the development to proceed.22 Moreover, the District
left the door open for Koontz to propose other conditions to offset the
anticipated wetland loss.23 Koontz, however, refused the District’s
17. Id. at 599-601. The description of the Koontz case set out in the next several para-
graphs draws from a blog post the author penned soon after the Supreme Court issued its
decision in June of 2013. See Tim Mulvaney, Koontz: 5-4 Supreme Court Sides with Land-
owner in Takings Case, ENVTL. L. PROF. BLOG (June 25, 2013), https://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/environmental_law/2013/06/koontz-5-4-supreme-court-sides-with-landowner-in-takings-
case.html [https://perma.cc/DJH8-WSYN]. 
18. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599-601.
19. BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION
§ 1:11 (2018 ed.) (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1224
(Fla. 2011)).
20. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 601.
21. Id. at 600-01; see 1984 Fla. Laws 204.
22. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 601-02, 607. According to Koontz, the offsite wetland improve-
ments would have cost him $90,000-$150,000. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Koontz,
570 U.S. 595 (No. 11-1447).
23. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602.
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proposals and chose not to offer any of his own.24 The District,
therefore, ultimately denied Koontz’s development application.25
Since the dawn of exactions in the 1930s on through the mid-
1980s, many state courts had policed the imposition of these permit
conditions via some iteration of a “reasonable relationship” test that
accounted for both the burdens and benefits of the imposed
exaction.26 Even in those states employing an arguably more
stringent “specifically and uniquely attributable” test, the courts
regularly placed the burden of proof on the permit applicant.27
However, to protect landowners from what it perceived as extortion-
ist behavior by permitting entities to unfairly shift infrastructure
and related costs onto individual landowners, the Supreme Court
curtailed the exercise of this power starting with its 1987 decision
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and buttressed by its
1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.28 Under this new constitu-
tional takings framework unique to exaction disputes, it is the gov-
ernment—as the defendant—who has the burden of proving that a
challenged exaction, which would amount to a taking outside the
permitting process, bears both an “essential nexus” to and “rough
24. Id. at 599.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976); Simpson v.
City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984).
27. Of the five state cases the Dolan Court cited as the foundation of its “rough propor-
tionality” test, all placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that the exaction bore
no semblance of reason. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994); Collis, 246
N.W.2d at 28; Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 301; Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 807; Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137
N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Wis. 1965). Dolan cited five state cases as employing the “specifically and
uniquely attributable” test that it deemed too demanding for federal constitutional purposes.
See 512 U.S. at 389-90 (citations omitted). However, at least four of these cases also placed
the burden of proof on the plaintiff. See Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,
176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ill. 1961); J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 13-14
(N.H. 1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Wayne, 334 A.2d 30, 37 (N.J.
1975); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm’n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971). The
lone possible exception is Frank Asuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, which arguably required the
state to prove that a developer’s “donation” of 7 percent of the land (to be subdivided for rec-
reational purposes) was a legitimate condition of final plan approval. 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I.
1970). 
28. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 396; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837,
841-42 (1987).
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proportionality” with the development’s impacts to avoid having to
pay compensation.29
The Nollan and Dolan decisions have been described as establish-
ing a form of heightened scrutiny.30 However, leading up to Koontz,
there was general agreement only that Nollan’s nexus and Dolan’s
proportionality standards apply when the state issues a land use
permit administratively conditioned on an applicant providing
strangers permanent access to her land.31 Debate raged on whether
the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan applied to any other
permit conditions.32 In this contested space, Koontz alleged that the
District’s proposed conditions were unconstitutional in light of
Nollan and Dolan, even though those conditions were never actually
imposed upon him and, in any event, did not require third-party
access to his land, as was the case in both Nollan and Dolan.33
29. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
30. See Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of
Tigard on Local Governments’ Land-Use Powers, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CON-
DITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 219, 219, 232 (David L. Callies
ed., 1996) (stating that Nollan and Dolan “clearly signaled the Court’s determination to
provide greater protection for private property rights” through the application of intermediate
judicial scrutiny); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and
the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 622 (2004) (“Nollan’s and Dolan’s ‘essential
nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ tests require courts to apply heightened scrutiny to
challenged land use regulations.”); Donald C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Direction of
Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L. REV. 327, 346 (1998)
(stating that the Court’s proportionality test “represents the application of heightened
scrutiny”); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Commentary, Euclid Lives: The Survival
of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2184-87 (2002) (suggesting that, in
Nollan and Dolan, the Court “lowered the bar ... for private property owners challenging
government regulation of land” by calling for a more significant level of scrutiny than had
previously been required in land use cases and placing the burden of proof on the defendant
government); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1651 (1988) (describing Nollan as calling for a
“closeness of fit between regulatory means and ends” and making sure that “the burden of the
regulation is properly placed on this landowner”); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 868 (1995) (suggesting that
Dolan’s rough proportionality test “appears to incorporate elements of both less restrictive
means analysis and cost-benefit analysis”); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1607-08 (1988) (“[T]he Court expressly endorsed a form of semi-strict or height-
ened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-ends relationships in the course of invalidating,
as a taking, the Commission’s conditional regulatory imposition on the Nollans.”). 
31. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 143-49 (2016).
32. See id.
33. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599, 602-03 (2013).
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The Florida Supreme Court rejected Koontz’s claim, but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four opinion in 2013.34 The
Court’s reversal explicitly expanded the application of the Nollan
and Dolan standards in two small ways. First, those standards now
apply to some situations in which the state conditions a develop-
ment permit on the payment of money.35 Second, those standards
now apply not only when the state actually imposes subject condi-
tions through an issued permit, but also when, in the midst of con-
versations with an applicant, the state proposes such conditions, so
long as the proposal constitutes a “concrete and specific ... de-
mand.”36
B. Exaction Takings Law in View
Nollan and Dolan diverge from the core principles of regulatory
takings jurisprudence in three specific ways: they shift the burden
of proof away from the claimant and toward the defendant govern-
ment entity; authorize a probing review of the relationship between
an exaction’s design and the public goals in imposing that exaction;
and allow for takings liability findings in instances in which the
economic impact of the exaction is quite modest. While this diver-
gence appeared motivated by the Nollan and Dolan Courts’ suppo-
sition that state offices regularly are populated by individuals
seeking to take undo advantage of vulnerable property owners,
Koontz was more direct in this regard. The Koontz Court referred to
the prospect of permitting officials attempting to “circumvent[ ]
Nollan and Dolan,”37 to “maneuver,”38 “coerc[e],”39 “evade[ ],”40 make
“[e]xtortionate demands,”41 and “leverage [the state’s] legitimate
34. Id. at 603-04.
35. See id. at 612; see also Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, 182 A.3d 798, 808 (Md. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 230 (2018) (explaining that, in Koontz, the “Nollan and Dolan line of
cases was expanded ... to apply to a narrow set of monetary exactions, i.e., a condition of the
payment of money for favorable governmental action on a required permit application for a
specific parcel of land” (citing Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599)).
36. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 610.
37. Id. at 599.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 604.
40. Id. at 599.
41. Id. at 605.
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interest[s].”42 It echoed Richard Epstein’s view that the permitting
process is a “holdup game” that is best understood as “a form of
highway robbery.”43
These claims of regular extortionate conduct by the state in the
land use permitting context have not been substantiated by em-
pirical evidence.44 Indeed, the limited empirical evidence that is
available suggests just the opposite: after following the Dolan
Court’s command to make “individualized determinations” of de-
velopment impacts, local governments realized that they had been
demanding far less mitigation than that sufficient to offset those
impacts.45
42. Id. at 606; see also Echeverria, supra note 4, at 51 (“Koontz reflects fierce suspicion
about the motivations of local government officials.”).
43. Richard A. Epstein, The Common Law Foundations of the Takings Clause: The
Disconnect Between Public and Private Law, 30 TOURO L. REV. 265, 292 (2014).
44. See, e.g., Koontz, 570 U.S. at 628-29 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (deeming Koontz’s
extension of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to monetary exactions “a prophylaxis in search of a
problem”).
45. See, e.g., DANIEL SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 169 (3d ed. 2008) (“A survey
of local California governments concluded that developers have been grossly undercharged
for the supporting infrastructure necessary to mitigate or accommodate the impacts of
projects.” (citing Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court’s Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103
(2001))). Recent work advocating that the state devise exactions aimed at the impacts of new
development on climate change and energy consumption buttress the view that favoritism
toward development interests—implicit or otherwise—may be more problematic in the
exactions context than the corruption about which Koontz roundly expressed concern. See
generally J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla, Climate Exactions, 75 MD. L. REV. 758 (2016);
Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643 (2019). Yet third
parties who bear the brunt of the externalities that permit conditions do not sufficiently off-
set have not yet had considerable success in transposing Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to their
advantage. However, it is possible to consider the recent California state court decision in
McAllister v. California Coastal Commission as demonstrating consideration for third parties
harmed by exactions that are excessively lenient on developers. In this case, at the urging of
neighbors opposed to an approved development, a state appellate court overturned the state
coastal commission’s granting of that approval for fear that denial might prompt a takings
claim when the record did not support the commission’s fears. See McAllister v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 386 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[O]ne would expect the record to reflect
some discussion of both the restriction and the taking issue.”). The author of this Article dis-
cussed the possibility of transposing exaction takings law some time ago. See Timothy
Mulvaney, Where the Wild Things Aren’t: Transposing Exaction Takings, Address at Gonzaga
University School of Law, Faculty Seminar (Sept. 30, 2010). In a recent work, Gregory Stein
explored this possibility, albeit from a slightly different angle and in far greater depth. See
generally Gregory M. Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2017) (rais-
ing the prospect of the permittee paying compensation to a neighbor where the government’s
granting a development permit with no or inadequate conditions “takes” that neighbor’s
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In the Koontz Court’s unsubstantiated vision of the state, though,
there is a surface appeal to grounding Nollan’s “nexus” and Dolan’s
“proportionality” standards in what is known as the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. As Justice Alito wrote for the majority in
Koontz, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine “vindicates the
Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government
from coercing people into giving them up.”46 He continued, “by
conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public
right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner
into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment
would otherwise require just compensation.... Extortionate de-
mands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just
compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine pro-
hibits them.”47
Dozens of lower court decisions that have cited to Koontz have
done so for the purpose of pointing to this description of the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine.48 Yet citing Koontz for this purpose
property).
46. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 604.
47. Id. at 605.
48. See Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 n.4 (2018);
Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Himes, 888 F.3d 224, 231-32 (6th Cir. 2018), rev’d en
banc, 917 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2019); Edwards v. City of Delray Beach, No. 16-15693, 2017 WL
2813838 (11th Cir. June 29, 2007); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 828 F.3d
1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2016); Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1265 (10th Cir. 2015);
Solida v. United States, 778 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of
Children & Families, 772 F.3d 1352, 1376 (11th Cir. 2014); Benjamin v. Stemple, No. 18-CV-
10849, 2018 WL 3069286, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2018); Thompson v. City of Oakwood,
307 F. Supp. 3d 761, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2018); Werkheiser v. Pocono Township, No. 16-CV-0015,
2018 WL 509814, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018); June Med. Servs. v. Gee, 280 F. Supp. 3d
849, 862 (M.D. La. 2017), motion to certify appeal denied, No. CV 16-00444-BAJ-RLB, 2018
WL 1041301 (M.D. La. Feb. 23, 2018); Country Mill Farms, LLC v. City of East Lansing, 280
F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1052 (W.D. Mich. 2017); Jamgotchian v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 269
F. Supp. 3d 604, 616 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F.
Supp. 3d 324, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, 890 F.3d 1124 (3d Cir. 2018), and aff’d, 897 F.3d 518
(3d Cir. 2018); Banks v. County of San Mateo, No. 16-CV-04455-YGR, 2017 WL 3434113, at
*14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017); Mamakos v. Town of Huntington, No. 16-CV-5775(SJF)(GRB),
2017 WL 2861719, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017), aff’d, No. 17-2318, 2018 WL 1377125 (2d
Cir. Mar. 19, 2018); Landon v. City of Flint, No. 16-11061, 2017 WL 2798414, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. June 27, 2017); Montagno v. City of Burlington, No. 2:16-CV-232, 2017 WL 2399456,
at *7-8 (D. Vt. June 1, 2017); Wagda v. Town of Danville, No. 16-CV-00488-MMC, 2017 WL
2311294, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017); Lea Family P’ship Ltd. v. City of Temple Terrace,
No. 8:16-CV-3463-T-30AAS, 2017 WL 1165583, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2017); Safelite Grp.
v. Rothman, 229 F. Supp. 3d 859, 873 (D. Minn. 2017); Gutierrez v. City of East Chicago, No.
182 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:169
is peculiar, for, upon closer inspection, the link between takings and
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence is not altogether appar-
ent.
Traditionally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is impli-
cated where two assumptions hold: (1) a person possesses an indi-
vidual constitutional right that she capably could waive, and (2) the
state has discretion to confer a benefit.49 In these situations, the
right is subject to coercion in exchange for the benefit, and it is
against such coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
aims to protect.50 For instance, individuals hold a First Amendment
right to free speech and the state has discretion to confer unemploy-
ment benefits; in turn, then, the state’s conditioning an award of
unemployment benefits on the waiver of free speech rights has been
deemed violative of the doctrine.51
2:16-CV-111-JVB-PRC, 2016 WL 5819818, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-CV-111 JVB, 2016 WL 5816804 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2016);
Boston Correll v. Herring, 212 F. Supp. 3d 584, 605 (E.D. Va. 2016); Planned Parenthood of
Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 188 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Wayside Church v. County
of Van Buren, No. 1:14-CV-1274, 2015 WL 13308900, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2015), vacated
sub nom., Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2017); O’Hare v.
Town of Gulf Stream, No. 13-CV-81053, 2015 WL 12977393, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2015);
Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Muhammad ex
rel. J.S. v. Abington Twp. Police Dep’t, 37 F. Supp. 3d 746, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Coppi v. City
of Dana Point, No. SACV111813 JGB (RNBx) 2014 WL 12589639 (C.D. Cal. 2014); State v.
Gray, 372 P.3d 999, 1007 (Ariz. 2016); San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist. of
S. Cal., 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 346, 375 (Ct. App. 2017); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123,
147 (Del. 2016); Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1139 (Fla. 2017); Williams v. State, 167
So. 3d 483, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), vacated, No. SC15-1417, 2016 WL 6637817 (Fla.
Nov. 9, 2016); State v. Yong Shik Won, 372 P.3d 1065, 1086 n.39 (Haw. 2015), as corrected
(Dec. 9, 2015); Nava-Mendoza v. Luna, 2015 Ill. App. (1st) 151553-U (2015); Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 75 N.E.3d 51, 71 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017); Commonwealth v. Dew, 33 Mass L. Rep.
78, 80 (Super. Ct. 2015); AFT Mich. v. State, 866 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. 2015); State ex rel.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 51 n.9 (Mo. 2017); Moongate Water Co. v. City of
Las Cruces, 329 P.3d 727, 733 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014); Town of Verona v. Cuomo, 997 N.Y.S.2d
670 (Sup. Ct. 2014); Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 373 P.3d 1057, 1071 (Okla. 2016), as
corrected (Mar. 4, 2016); Marchese v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 169 A.3d 733 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017); Yucha v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., No. 1917 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
4542374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 12, 2017); Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., No. 2016-MO-026, 2016 WL
4208093 (S.C. Aug. 10, 2016).
49. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
50. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 604.
51. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963). The Supreme Court originally set
out the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in striking down a state statute conferring the
right of commercial carriers to utilize state highways on the condition that they assume the
burdens and duties of common carriers. See Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
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The Takings Clause, however, does not confer an individual right
not to have property taken; instead, it requires only that the state
pay just compensation when it chooses to take property.52 And, im-
portantly, takings law long has recognized that just compensation
need not come in the form of money but instead can be presented in-
kind.53 If an applicant chooses to accept a discretionary development
permit conditioned on the conferral of an easement, for example, the
applicant is asserting that the in-kind compensation—the develop-
ment authorized by the permit—is more valuable than the monetary
compensation for the right-of-way that the Constitution presump-
tively requires.54 Koontz itself stated that “[a] predicate for any un-
constitutional conditions claim is that the government could not
have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do
what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.”55 The Court
recently made this point even clearer by rejecting a claim that “con-
dition[ing] the benefit of a patent on accepting the possibility of in-
ter partes review” is unconstitutional because, the Court concluded,
inter partes review “is something Congress can ‘command directly’”
under its Article I authority.56 Query: Could the government, con-
sistent with the Takings Clause, appropriate an interest in real
property by ordering the owner to accept in-kind compensation of
more market value than the amount of money that Supreme Court
precedent has deemed “just compensation”? Of course it could.
Koontz’s preventing the state from offering a landowner such a
choice, therefore, is logical only in those instances in which the state
does not actually have the discretion to deny the development
(1926). For a very recent, traditional application of the doctrine, see U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev.
v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (declaring that a requirement that prospective
recipients declare their opposition to prostitution amounted to an unconstitutional condition
of state-funded financial aid).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 195-215 (1985); see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1218 (1967).
54. As one scholar colorfully explained, “Justice Alito has implicitly adopted the novel,
indeed bizarre position that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply even in the
absence of government action that violates the Constitution.” Echeverria, supra note 4, at 27.
55. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 612 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rts., 547
U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006)).
56. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 n.4 (2018).
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permit in the first place.57 If the Water Management District did not
have such discretion in Koontz, imposing the permit conditions at
issue effectively would have appropriated the easement without
following the payment procedures of formal condemnation.58 Yet
the Court did not provide any basis for the proposition that the
Water Management District did not have discretion to deny the per-
mit Mr. Koontz requested.59 Moreover, if there were such a basis, it
would negate one of the two aforementioned assumptions on which
the theory of unconstitutional conditions traditionally has rested:
the state must have discretion to confer a benefit.60 At best, then,
Koontz supports what the Court described in dicta in an earlier case
as a “special application” of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine61 that, at least as explained thus far, lacks a theoretical foun-
dation.
C. Summary
The property owner’s claim in Koontz came to the Court under
the guise of a body of exaction takings law that rests on question-
able foundations. Nollan and Dolan had called on the judiciary to
examine government decisions on social and economic policy with
such a probing eye that the cases drew comparisons to Lochner
itself;62 moreover, Nollan and Dolan made the rare move of shifting
the burden of proof to the government entity against whom a prop-
erty owner levels a charge of unconstitutional conduct.63 Koontz
further destabilized the case for Nollan and Dolan scrutiny by un-
justifiably, if steadfastly, situating exactions takings law within the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
These problematic foundations set the bounds within which the
lower courts were tasked with interpreting Koontz’s bearing on the
outstanding takings issues—involving monetary impositions,
57. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005).
58. See id.
59. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 607-08.
60. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996).
63. See Haar & Wolf, supra note 30, at 2184-87.
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exactions and other regulatory measures devised through legisla-
tion, the requisite concreteness and specificity of demands, and the
available remedies—that are the central focus of this Article’s re-
maining Parts. If the lower courts were to define broadly those
monetary and proposed actions to which Koontz declares Nollan and
Dolan scrutiny applies and extend such scrutiny to those actions
implemented through legislation—all with the support of an expan-
sive suite of remedies—observers could look back on Koontz as
initiating a revolutionary change across the takings landscape.
II. IN THE WAKE OF KOONTZ: POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS
INSIDE THE EXACTIONS CONTEXT
Koontz has been cited in nearly 130 lower court opinions through
July of 2018. About 90 of the courts in these cases did so for very
general purposes, including Koontz’s summary of takings law64 and,
as noted above, Koontz’s ill-considered but, outside the takings
space, largely harmless explanation of the basic parameters of the
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.65 Though the cataloguing
thereafter admittedly posed some challenges given the intricacies
of individual disputes, the bulk of the remaining cases can be in-
terpreted as touching on the following issues on which Koontz did
not explicitly opine: whether courts would interpret broadly the
class of monetary impositions that Koontz instructs are subject to
Nollan and Dolan scrutiny;66 whether courts would extend Nollan
and Dolan to permit conditions imposed not only through indi-
vidualized administrative decisions but also to those imposed via
64. See, e.g., Caquelin v. United States, No. 2016-1663, 2017 WL 2684180 (Fed. Cir. June
21, 2017); Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm No.1, LLC v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485 (7th
Cir. 2014); Edmonson v. Fremgen, No. 14-1925, 2014 WL 5422851 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 2014);
Cedar Point Nursery v. Gould, No. 1:16-cv-00185-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 3549408 (E.D. Ca. June
29, 2016); Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019
(E.D. Ill. 2016); City of Perris v. Stamper, 376 P.3d 1221 (Cal. 2016); Surfrider Found. v.
Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382 (Ct. App. 2017); Scheinberg v. County of
Samona, No. A135286, 2014 WL 5305857 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2014); Town of Ponce Inlet
v. Pacetta, LLC, 226 So. 3d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 351
P.3d 736 (Nev. 2015); Delchester Developers, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Twp. of London
Grove, 161 A.3d 1081 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
65. See supra Part I.B.
66. See infra Part II.A.
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broadly applicable legislation;67 whether courts would interpret
broadly the class of proposed conditions deemed “concrete and
specific” enough to implicate Nollan and Dolan;68 and whether
courts would expand the remedies available in exaction takings
cases.69 This Part takes up these four issues in turn, beginning with
monetary impositions.
A. Monetary Impositions
1. Issue
The theoretical case for applying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in the exactions context is especially challenging when the
permit condition does not involve the conferral of an easement
authorizing third-party access, but instead requires the applicant to
pay, spend, or forego money. As intimated at the outset of this Ar-
ticle, Nollan and Dolan operated on the assumption that the state’s
demand in the form of a permit condition, if imposed in isolation
outside the permitting process, automatically would have triggered
takings law’s compensation requirement.70 A decade after Dolan, the
Court reiterated the Nollan and Dolan Courts’ reliance on this
assumption.71 Remarking on Nollan and Dolan in an opinion for a
unanimous Court in Lingle v. Chevron, Justice O’Connor wrote that
“[i]n each case, the Court began with the premise that, had the
government simply appropriated the easement in question, this
would have been a per se physical taking.”72
67. See infra Part II.B.
68. See infra Part II.C.
69. See infra Part II.D.
70. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“Without question, had the city
simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather
than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a
taking would have occurred.”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (“Had
California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available
to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach ... we have
no doubt there would have been a taking.”). 
71. See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (taking care not
“to disturb these precedents”).
72. See id. at 546. The author has explored the relationship between Lingle and exaction
takings law in prior work. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L.
REV. 511, 548-54 (2012); Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L.
2019] THE STATE OF EXACTIONS 187
The Lingle Court rested this statement on the Court’s 1982
assertion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. that
“permanent occupations of land ... are takings even if they occupy
only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously
interfere with the landowner’s use of the rest of his land.”73 While
I contend below that Loretto’s categorical nature is overstated, the
point can be set aside for the moment to note that the state, of
course, can condition discretionary development permits on a wide
range of demands that do not require the occupation of land. 
Indeed, the state routinely conditions development permits on re-
quirements that the applicant pay for, spend money on, or forgo
potential earnings in the pursuit of measures to mitigate develop-
ment impacts on third parties. Consider, for instance, requirements
to pay into a wetlands mitigation fund, create culverts to increase
wetland functionality, or record a conservation restriction to pre-
serve wetlands. To suggest that every state request that an appli-
cant pay, spend, or forgo money should be considered on its own as
amounting to a compensable taking outside the permitting process
is effectively to suggest that the state is constitutionally prohibited
from collecting or requiring any financial outlays or forbearances
relating to land at all, absent a clear and sufficient nonmonetary
offset transferred by the state to the applicant. (A monetary offset
is impracticable given that the amount of compensation necessarily
would equal what the applicant just paid, spent, or forwent.74 ) If an
applicant chooses to accept a discretionary development permit to
which such a condition is attached, she is asserting that the in-kind
compensation/offset—the development authorized by the permit—is
more valuable than the monetary compensation/offset she would
receive for the taking or the money she was asked to pay, spend, or
forgo.
REV. F. 66, 69 (2015); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y J. 189, 212-27 (2010).
73. 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
74. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 335-36. Two commentators raise the
possibility that, exclusively for administrability purposes, it might be most prudent to subject
permit condition requirements to pay or spend money to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny, while
leaving conditions that require the applicant to forgo potential earnings immune from such
heightened scrutiny. See Wake & Bona, supra note 3, at 562 n.139.
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For these reasons, among others, a majority of the lower court
opinions that addressed this issue leading up to Koontz did not
subject those permits conditioned on such monetary outlays or for-
bearances to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny.75 Indeed, prior to Koontz,
most monetary demands were not subject to any takings analysis at
all.76 Only the state’s appropriation of a specific pool of money
triggered takings review,77 and even in such exceptional cases, only
under the far less demanding framework set out in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.78 Koontz, though, rejected the
general distinction between monetary and in-kind conditions that
75. See Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that
Nollan and Dolan only apply to permit conditions that require a physical invasion of
property); Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The mere imposition
of an obligation to pay money ... does not give rise to a claim under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.” (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2001))); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1998) (expressing
“considerable doubt” about the applicability of Dolan’s rough proportionality standard to “fee
exactions, as opposed to physical exactions”); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578
(10th Cir. 1995) (declaring that Dolan’s heightened scrutiny is inapplicable to fees imposed
as a condition of a landowner’s exercise of her property rights to hunt on her own land because
no physical occupation occurred); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 757-58 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (conditioning approval on expenditures is not a taking); Home Builders Ass’n of Cent.
Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (finding a water resource
development fee not subject to Dolan’s heightened scrutiny); Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695 (Colo. 2001) (holding that Dolan analysis does not apply to
sanitation fee); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (declining to
apply Dolan beyond property dedications to impact fees); City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d
802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (holding that the tests applied in Nollan and Dolan should not be
extended to impact fees imposed to mitigate the direct effects of new development or general
growth impact fees imposed pursuant to statutorily authorized ordinances). But see Ehrlich
v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (applying Dolan to recreation fees); N. Ill.
Home Builders Ass’n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390-91 (Ill. 1995) (applying Dolan
to transportation impact fees); J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County., 887 P.2d 360, 365-66
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (applying Dolan to transportation impact fees); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (applying Dolan to park fees); Benchmark Land Co.
v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that Nollan and
Dolan apply “where the City requires the developer as a condition of approval to incur
substantial costs improving an adjoining street”).
76. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington represents the rare exception. See 538 U.S.
216, 234-35 (2003) (setting out an exception to the general rule that financial impositions are
not subject to a takings analysis for situations in which the state unilaterally targets a
specific pool of money, such as, here, interest earned on a specific trust account).
77. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1998).
78. Brown, 538 U.S. at 217-18 (applying Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978)).
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had been recognized by many lower courts.79 According to the
Koontz Court, some monetary demands that do not target a specific
pool, but instead are attached in some way to a specific piece of
land, not only are subject to takings review but “amount to a per se
taking similar to the taking of an easement or lien.”80 
Koontz clearly did not intend to subject to heightened scrutiny all
monetary conditions with any connection to land, for Justice Alito
explicitly noted for the majority that “[t]his case ... does not affect
the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and
similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on
property owners.”81 The Court deemed of little “practical difficulty”
distinguishing between (a) the class of financial burdens that suf-
ficiently resembles property taxes and user fees, and (b) the class
that does not.82 However, in support of this position, the Court
merely cited to select cases in which lower courts have evaluated
whether local governments are authorized under specific state
statutes to assess certain taxes.83 These cases are hardly the type of
precedents useful for courts tasked with determining whether a
financial obligation imposed by the state on an individual property
owner more closely resembles a property tax, a user fee, or some-
thing else, for constitutional takings purposes. The citation to this
line of cases, however, does provide an indication from the Court
that, unlike the allegedly acontextual approach of Loretto and its
progeny in physical appropriation cases, context matters in
79. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 510 U.S. 595, 614-16 (2013).
80. Id. at 615; see also id. at 614 (asserting that the “fulcrum” of the holding was “the
direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property”).
81. Id. at 615. A number of lower courts generally cited Koontz for this point. See Temple-
Inland, Inc. v. Cook, 192 F. Supp. 3d 527 (D. Del. 2016); Page v. City of Wyandotte, No. 15-CV-
10575, 2015 WL 6164004 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2015); United States v. King Mountain Tobacco
Co., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (E.D. Wash. 2015); Russo v. Township of Plumsted, No. CIV.A. 13-
5082 PGS T, 2014 WL 3459066 (D.N.J. July 11, 2014); Hotze v. Sibelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d
864 (S.D. Tex. 2014); McClain v. Sav-On Drugs, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416 (Ct. App. 2017), as
modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 10, 2017); Merscorp Holdings, Inc. v. Malloy, No.
X04HHDCV136043132S, 2014 WL 486952 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2014); Trantham v.
State Disbursement Unit, 882 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), vacated in part, appeal
denied in part sub nom. Trantham v. State Disbursement Unit, 885 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 2016);
see also Wayside Church v. County of Van Buren, No. 1:14-CV-1274, 2015 WL 13308900, at
*1 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2015), vacated sub nom. Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847
F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2017).
82. Koontz, 510 U.S. at 615.
83. Id. at 618.
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determining whether no takings review, Penn Central review, or
Nollan and Dolan review applies to financial impositions attached
to development permits. Just how it matters in a post-Koontz world,
though, remains an open book.
2. Movement Post-Koontz
Amidst Koontz’s cloudiness on this point, the lower courts citing
to Koontz have construed the class of financial burdens subject to
Nollan and Dolan scrutiny very narrowly. Consider the matters of
Malone Investments, LLC v. Somerset County Sanitary District,
Inc.,84 Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan,85 and Willie Pearl
Burrell Trust v. City of Kankakee.86
Malone Investments involved a fee imposed upon new developers
to fund a sewer service project, while prior developers of neighbor-
ing lots who would benefit from the project did not have to pay such
fees.87 A Maryland appellate court held that the development com-
pany did not have a vested interest in complimentary sewer service
such that any takings analysis—let alone the “strict scrutiny” of
Koontz—was inapposite.88 Instead, the court explained, the com-
pany’s claim of unfairness fit more squarely within the realm of
equal protection review, and its attendant rational basis standard.89 
84. No. 0476, 2016 WL 3185229, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 8, 2016).
85. 424 P.3d 95 (Utah 2017).
86. 56 N.E.3d 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
87. Malone Invs., 2016 WL 3185229, at *1. 
88. Id. at *2; see id. at *4 (“[T]he Takings Clause protects property owners against certain
types of government action that reduce the value of property. However, the Takings Clause
does not impose an affirmative obligation upon government to enhance property values [by
providing free sewer service].”); see also Santiago-Ramos v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica
de P.R., No. CIV. 11-1987 JAG/SCC, 2015 WL 846750, at *2 (D.P.R. Feb. 26, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Ramos v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R., No. CIV.
11-1987 JAG, 2015 WL 1416745 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2015), aff'd sub nom. Santiago-Ramos v.
Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, AEE, 834 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs
are not complaining about their service being terminated; to the contrary, they are paying
their bills and complaining about the uses to which those payments are put. I therefore see
no basis for holding that AEE customers have a property interest in electric services as
such.”). A federal appellate court affirmed this decision on the grounds that, because the cus-
tomers do not have a property interest in electric services, they lacked standing. See Santiago-
Ramos, 834 F.3d 103.
89. Malone Invs., 2016 WL 3185229, at *4.
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In Alpine Homes, a developer claimed that the state’s failure to
spend impact fees it had collected made their initial collection an
unconstitutional taking and thus necessitated their return.90 Utah’s
Supreme Court explained that a pre-Koontz state statute requires
its state courts to review impact fees under the heightened scrutiny
of Nollan and Dolan.91 However, the court refused to extend Koontz
to consider, in the course of exaction takings analyses, whether and
how impact fees ultimately are spent.92 Rather, the court concluded
that the time to challenge a permit condition under Nollan and
Dolan is upon its proposition.93
Interestingly, the Alpine Homes court noted that the people hurt
by any unspent fees are not the developers who pay those fees, but
instead are those third parties who bear the brunt of the impacts
those fees were supposed to be used to offset.94 In doing so, the court
seemingly left open the possibility of transposing the exaction
takings standard to encompass not only applicants’ claims that per-
mit conditions are too stringent, but also neighbors’ claims that
permit conditions imposed on others are too lenient.95 Its holding,
though, shows no interest in extending heightened review to the
continuous monitoring of the state’s expending impact fees or to
the actual development impacts as they arise after a permit is is-
sued.96 In its view, tasking courts with deciding under takings law
whether and when impact fees should be returned—because the
state, however reasonably, over-estimated the impact of new de-
velopment—also would suggest that the state is authorized to
demand additional fees from developers when it turns out that the
impact fees originally imposed on those developers are insufficient
90. Alpine Homes, 424 P.3d at 100-01.
91. Id. at 103. 
92. Id. at 100, 105.
93. Id. at 105 (“The demand for property is either permissible or forbidden under the tak-
ings clause at the time the demand is made based upon an evaluation of the ‘projected impact
of [the] proposed development.’” (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994))).
In this regard, consider John Nolon’s recent writing on the advantages of “contingency
bargaining.” See generally John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers Negotiating
Above Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 521 (2013).
94. Alpine Homes, 424 P.3d at 107-08.
95. For a brief discussion of transposing exaction takings claims, see supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
96. See Alpine Homes, 424 P.3d at 105.
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to offset the impacts of that development.97 Such an approach would
reflect a level of second-guessing state decisions that the Alpine
Homes court did not deem prudent to take on.98
Finally, Willie Pearl Burrell Trust v. City of Kankakee involved a
requirement that applicants pay all outstanding debts to the city
before receiving any land use approvals.99 In this instance, the city
refused an applicant’s request to renew licenses to rent properties
for residential purposes when the applicant owed the city over
$40,000 for a collection of tickets issued for code violations.100 The
applicant maintained that, because the debt it owed to the city “did
not stem from any of the properties for which it sought rental li-
censes, there did not exist a sufficient nexus [under Nollan] between
defendant’s demand and the licenses requested.”101 The applicant
relied on Koontz in asserting that the payment requirement
amounted to a taking on its own, and that conditioning the renewal
license on this payment constituted “an infringement upon its right
to be free of a taking without just compensation.”102
An Illinois appellate panel rejected this claim. It interpreted
Koontz to extend Nollan and Dolan scrutiny only to monetary obli-
gations that are “inextricably tied” to a “specific parcel of land.”103
Here, it found the city’s demand for money did not meet this thresh-
old, for it stemmed from a generally applicable ordinance that not
only barred the applicant from receiving rental licenses—which
necessarily are related to properties the applicant owns throughout
the city—but any type of license at all.104
3. Summary
Koontz was not up to the challenge of delineating which permit
conditions requiring applicants to pay, spend, or forgo opportunities
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See 56 N.E.3d 1067, 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1077.
102. Id. at 1078.
103. Id. at 1079 (quoting the pre-Koontz Illinois Supreme Court decision in Empress Casino
Joliet Corp. v. Giannovlias, 896 N.E.2d 277, 292 (Ill. 2008), interpreting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s splintered holding in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
104. See id.
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to accumulate money are appropriately subject to the exacting
review set out in Nollan and Dolan. Prominent takings scholars,
working within Koontz’s confines, have proposed limiting princi-
ples—such as distinguishing between “fees” and “expenditures”105
or concentrating on the extent to which a monetary obligation is
“designed to replace a physical exaction”106—though each proposal
to date is wrought with challenges.107 If not collectively resting on
105. See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 14 ECOLOGY L. Q.
131, 131-32 (2014). Pidot contends that conditions requiring permit applicants to directly
transfer money to the government (fees) should be subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny, while
conditions requiring permit applicants to spend money in undertaking mitigation measures
(expenditures) should not. See id. at 131. Somewhat peculiarly, he likens this fee-expenditure
distinction to the distinction between direct appropriation and regulation that underlines the
conventional view of takings law, despite critiquing this conventional view. See id. at 154-55
(writing that distinguishing between physical and regulatory takings “fails to account for the
multiplicity of regulatory regimes that impose positive obligations on landowners”). 
106. See Shelley Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 105 (2016).
According to Saxer, only those individually accessed monetary obligations that are “designed
to replace a physical exaction” or “evade ... an occupation” of the sort at issue in Loretto should
be subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. Id. at 110-11. Saxer’s claim,
therefore, is grounded in the normative view that regulatory decisions that result in the
forced, permanent physical invasion by third-party strangers are of special concern (a view
that Pidot accepts as a doctrinal reality but questions on normative grounds). Her conclusion,
though, asserting that Koontz involved such an exaction is debatable. See id. at 111. Neither
of the exactions allegedly proposed to the applicant—reducing the size of his development or
funding wetland improvements on nearby District-owned land—involved a forced, permanent
physical invasion by a third-party stranger to which Loretto applies; moreover, the District,
unlike the City of New York in Loretto, gave the applicant the opportunity to propose alter-
native conditions that would fulfill the government’s end of mitigating the development’s
impacts. See generally Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
107. Pidot’s thesis is difficult to square doctrinally, for it rests on the erroneous assumption
that takings law is centered on the formal, direct-appropriation/regulation dichotomy on
which his proposed fee/expenditure distinction is based. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-
Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 153-54 (2018). Pidot offers two more pragmatic
justifications for the fee-expenditure distinction, though they too are not free from challenge.
He asserts that failing to recognize the fee-expenditure distinction would cripple local gov-
ernments given their “ubiquitous” use of conditions requiring expenditures. Pidot, supra note
105, at 137. However, takings claimants might well counter that the ubiquity of what they
see as unconnected and exorbitant expenditure requirements imposed through the permitting
process does not dictate that those impositions should be immunized from takings liability;
otherwise, unconnected and exorbitant fees would be immunized if they, too, were ubiquitous.
Pidot also seeks to justify the application of Nollan and Dolan to fees as protecting permit
applicants from efforts by regulators “to leverage permitting authority to pad government
coffers” or “aggrandize[ ] ... property for itself.” Id. at 139, 159. Yet, beyond the generic asser-
tion that subjecting expenditures to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny would “substantially increase
the cost to government of regulating,” id. at 160, the normative principle underpinning the
claim that the state could be seen as illegitimately leveraging its authority in demanding the
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a consistent, generalizable theory, the lower courts who have faced
Koontz-driven claims to date have been reluctant to construe the
class of financial burdens subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny in
even moderately broad terms.
B. Legislative Exactions
1. Issue
One of the most pressing questions across the entire realm of tak-
ings law involves whether the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and
Dolan applicable to certain types of exactions imposed via case-by-
case administration also is applicable when those types of exactions
are imposed via broadly applicable legislative formulas or direc-
tives.108 Prior to Koontz, the Court denied fifteen petitions for
certiorari raising the issue.109 To some observers, though, the Koontz
payment of a fee for mitigation and not in demanding that the applicant pay to complete that
mitigation herself is not altogether evident. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 45, at 169.
Meanwhile, Saxer’s approach also poses the evidentiary difficulty of a plaintiff mounting a
case that a monetary exaction actually is “designed to replace a physical exaction”—or, more
appropriately following the burden-of-proof allocation underpinning Nollan and Dolan, a state
defendant proving the negative. Saxer, supra note 106, at 111.
108. It admittedly is not always evident whether a specific exaction should be deemed
administrative or legislative. For a prominent example, compare Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a city council’s rejection
of a site plan application over the recommendation of the city’s planning commission was
legislative), with Richard A. Epstein, Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Hills: How to Make
Procedural Due Process Disappear, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689, 1697-98 (2007) (asserting that
Judge Posner’s classification of the governmental decision in Coniston Corp. as legislative
was “astonishing” and “wholly unconvincing,” and “takes the common deferential stance in
land use to new heights”). See also B.A.M. Dev. v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 728 n.23
(Utah Ct. App. 2006) (“[S]ome exactions are somewhere in the middle of adjudicative and
legislative because the legislature [may give] some guidelines, [while] the administrative body
retains considerable discretion as well.” (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000))). The discussion in the text does
not address precisely where to draw the line between administrative and legislative exactions,
but instead operates on the assumption that at least some government acts fall into each
category. On the difficulty of line drawing in this space, see, for example, Fennell & Peñalver,
supra note 4, at 314-17, 342-46; see also Washington Townhomes, LLC v. Washington Cty.
Water Conservancy Dist., 388 P.3d 753, 758 (Utah 2016) (“The threshold question of whether
the District's impact fee regime was legislatively adopted is a difficult one.”).
109. These petitions include Alto Eldorado P’ship v. County of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170
(10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 880 ( 2011); Mead v. City of Cotati, No. 09-15005, 2010
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Court established momentum toward rejecting the legislative-
administrative distinction down the line.110
WL 2931431 (9th Cir. July 22, 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1007 (2011); McClung v. City of
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders of the United States v. Chesterfield County, 92 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1056 (1997); Ehrlich v. City Of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1994), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996); Action Apartment Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica, 166 Cal. Rptr.
3d 722 (Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1237 (2009); Agencia La Esperanza Corp. v.
Orange Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. G027288, 2002 WL 681798 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2002),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003); Schaumburg v. Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 (1996); New York v. Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995); Long Clove, LLC v. Town of Woodbury, 795 N.Y.S.2d
458 (App. Div. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1215 (2006); Rogers Mach. Co. v. Washington
County, 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003); Drebick v. City of
Olympia, 126 P.3d 803 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 988 ( 2006). The petition in San
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco sought review on several questions,
including whether legislatively imposed exactions should be scrutinized under the Nollan and
Dolan standards. 364 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (2005). While the
Court granted that petition, it did so only to address a question surrounding issue preclusion
in federal court when a state court previously ruled on a takings claim under state
constitutional law. See id. The Court has denied two such petitions since Koontz. See Cal Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016);
616 Croft Ave., LLC, v. City of West Hollywood, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (Ct. App. 2016), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
110. See Marc J. Herman, The Continuing Struggle Against Government Extortion, and
Why the Time Is Now Right to Employ Heightened Scrutiny to All Exactions, 46 URB. LAW.
655, 673 (2014) (“[I]n its most recent takings decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District, the Supreme Court has implicitly signaled that both legislative and
adjudicative exactions are deserving of heightened scrutiny.”); Elizabeth Tisher, Land-Use
Regulation After Koontz: Will We "Rue" the Court's Decision?, 38 VT. L. REV. 743, 767 (2014)
(“[T]he [Koontz] Court impliedly extended Nollan and Dolan analysis to legislative exactions
by abrogating McClung and by not qualifying its holding that monetary exactions are subject
to heightened scrutiny.”). There is a subliminal, if far-fetched, interpretive argument to sup-
port this position. At issue in the oft-discussed California case of Ehrlich v. City of Culver City
was Culver City’s conditioning the approval of a re-zoning request on a recreation mitigation
fee imposed ad hoc and an “in-lieu” fee imposed pursuant to the city’s “art in public places”
ordinance. 911 P.2d 429, 435 (Cal. 1996). The California Supreme Court found Nollan and
Dolan applicable to the former, but not the latter. Id. at 439, 450. One could contend that
Koontz was signaling its disapproval of Ehrlich’s legislative-administrative distinction by
citing Ehrlich as a case holding that Nollan and Dolan can apply to fees (in addition to
dedications of land), see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 603
(2013), but, later in the opinion, only citing cases applying Nollan and Dolan to legislative
exactions—and thus declining to include Erhlich—when asserting that state courts in the
most populous states have applied Nollan and Dolan to fees without the “significant practical
harm” forecasted by the dissent. Id. at 618.
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2. Movement Post-Koontz
Eight of the ten courts to address the issue since Koontz have
affirmatively declined to extend Nollan and Dolan to permit con-
ditions imposed via generally applicable legislation. In the above-
referenced case of Willie Pearl, an Illinois appellate panel explained
that a city ordinance requiring the payment of all municipal debts
prior to receipt of any land use approval “is ... not the sort of ad hoc
demand contemplated in Koontz, but simple compliance with a
straightforward ordinance.”111 Seven other courts have said the
same of generally applicable ordinances, including those requiring
developers to assure that a set percentage of units in residential
complexes are affordable for low-income families;112 establish a
buffer between all development and “critical areas,” including wet-
lands;113 pay school and transportation impact fees on a pre-
determined schedule;114 conduct traffic studies and ensure that the
development will not exceed existing carrying capacity when com-
pleted;115 confirm that all new development connects to water reuse
systems;116 and display art on the premises or contribute funds to
city arts projects.117
111. Willie Pearl Burrell v. City of Kankee, 56 N.E.3d 1067, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). But
see David L. Callies & Christopher T. Goodin, The Status of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 40 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 539, 599 n.196 (2007) (suggesting that Illinois rejects the legislative-administrative
distinction).
112. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 991 (Cal. 2014); 2910 Georgia
Ave. LLC v. D.C., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 305 (D.D.C. 2017).
113. Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., Nos. 7-2235-2-I, 7-2236-1-I, 2015
WL 4730204, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).
114. Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, 182 A.3d 798, 813 (Md. 2018), cert. denied, No. 18-54,
2018 WL 3377873 (Oct. 1, 2018) (“Impact fees imposed by legislation applicable on an area-
wide basis are not subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny.”).
115. Golf Course Assoc., LLC v. New Castle County, No. 15A-02-007JAP, 2016 WL
1425367, at *2, *18 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2016) (“[T]he unconstitutional exactions doc-
trine should not be applied here.... [T]he exaction must come in the form of a demand arising
from an administrative requirement particular to the requested land use permit.... In this
case there is a statutory scheme applicable to all property owners in the county.”).
116. Highlands-in-the-Woods, LLC v. Polk County, 217 So. 3d 1175, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017).
117. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
Powell v. County of Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 749-50 (Ct. App. 2014) involved an
ordinance requiring all owners within a one-mile radius of an airport to grant airspace
easements to receive a building permit. The trial court had rejected application of Nollan and
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Each of these opinions rested its holding on some iteration of the
following two-part doctrinal argument: (1) the takings disputes in
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz involved individual judgments about the
applicability of those policies to particular parcels;118 and (2) the
Supreme Court’s repeated reference to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny
as applying to “adjudicative decisions”119 indicates that such scruti-
ny is not relevant in takings suits involving exactions that are part
of a community-wide plan and broadly applicable.120 If more
Dolan to legislative exactions. Id. at 752. This court, though, rejected the landowner’s claim
because the demand fell outside the permitting context and did not meet the threshold
requirement that the condition would amount to a taking. Id. at 757-58. Therefore, the court
did not reach the legislative-administrative question. Id. at 763 n.14. (“We do not reach the
trial court's additional ground for ruling in favor of the County—that the Nollan and Dolan
analysis applies only to discretionary, adjudicatory impositions of exaction conditions, not to
exactions applied to all similarly situated property owners on an identical, nondiscretionary
basis by legislative enactment.”).
118. See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1056; Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San
Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 974 (Cal. 2015); Golf Course Assoc., 2016 WL 1425367, at *1; Highlands-
in-the-Woods, 217 So. 3d at 1175; Willie Pearl Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 56 N.E.3d 1067,
1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Dabbs, 182 A.3d at 801-02; Common Sense All., 2015 WL 4730204,
at *1. The City of San Jose and a group of interveners recently set out this position in
opposing a developer’s petition for a writ of certiorari in California Building Industry Asso-
ciation. See City of San Jose’s Answer Brief on the Merits at 46-48, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n,
351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015) (No. 5212072); Defendant-Appellant Intervener’s Answer Brief on
the Merits at 38, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015) (No. S212072).
119. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (“Both Nollan and Dolan
involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically,
government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her
property as a condition of obtaining a development permit.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 385 (1994) (“[H]ere the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel.”); see also City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (“[W]e have
not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions—
land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to
public use.”).
120. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 991;
Golf Course Assoc., 2016 WL 1425367, at *18; Highlands-in-the-Woods, 217 So. 3d at 1180;
Willie Pearl, 56 N.E.3d at 1079; Dabbs, 182 A.3d at 813; Common Sense All., 2015 WL 473032
at *7. Some scholars have offered the counter view that the Court’s references to “adjudicative
decisions” distinguishes not between different types of exactions but only between large-scale
regulatory mechanisms, such as zoning, and smaller-scale regulatory mechanisms, such as
exactions. See James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 405-07
(2009); Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10100, 10103-05 (2000); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal
Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1861
(2010); see also J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and
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implicit, the decisions also leaned on the normative view that the
state is significantly less likely to take inappropriate advantage of
the leverage provided by a development application in the legis-
lative context than in the adjudicative one.121 Several reasons
underlie this assessment. First, legislative decisions usually are
devised by the most high-ranking government officials through a
more transparent process with more political checks and balances
than those reached administratively.122 Suspicions can arise where
discussions surrounding the parameters of individual permits are
conducted behind closed doors and anchored by relatively lower-
level permitting officials.123 Second, the generality of a legislative
act helps ensure some measure of reciprocal advantage.124 Third,
exposing legislative exactions to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny could
put the judiciary in the position of regularly micromanaging local
governments’ fiscal decisions and thereby stifle municipalities’ abil-
ities to make responsible roadway, utility, and other plans for the
future.
Federal District Court Judge Charles Breyer authored the only
two post-Koontz decisions to reject the legislative-administrative
distinction in the exactions context. In the first, Levin v. City &
County of San Francisco, Judge Breyer offered two doctrinal reasons
to subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny a San Francisco ordinance
requiring all landlords who withdraw rent-controlled properties
Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 401-02 (2002); Callies & Goodin, supra note 111, at 563-64;
Christopher T. Goodin, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction Between Administrative
and Legislative Exactions: “A Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference,” 28 U. HAW. L.
REV. 139, 158-67 (2005).
121. This paragraph draws in part from Mulvaney, supra note 31, at 149-51.
122. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 4, at 55.
123. See Karl Manheim, Rent Control in the New Lochner Era, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 211, 255 (2005); David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on
the Practice and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 761 (1999).
124. See Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic
Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 39 (2004) (suggesting that
applicants tasked by administrators with abiding by certain permit conditions “are without
power to ‘protect themselves through the political process [by] engaging in logrolling to ensure
that they do not receive an unfair share of the public’s burden’”).
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from the rental market to pay their displaced tenants money that
those tenants presumably would put toward relocation.125
First, he contended that Koontz instructed as much. Koontz,
Judge Breyer explained, found it meaningful that the Water
Management District’s demand for money “‘operated[d] upon ... an
identified property interest by directing the owner of a particular
piece of property to make a monetary payment.”126 Judge Breyer
interpreted this statement from Koontz to mean that Nollan and
Dolan apply in every case in which a property owner “wishing to
make a different use of a property ... must apply to the City for a
permit to do so.”127
To assert that Koontz decided the issue cuts against the near
universal assessment by takings scholars in Koontz’s immediate
wake that the Court—through its repeated references to Koontz’s
“specific” parcel and the Water Management District’s “discre-
tion”—did no such thing.128 Moreover, that the Court left the
125. 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (arguing that Koontz overrules McClung
(rejecting the application of Nollan and Dolan to legislative exactions) and Garneau (rejecting
facial Nollan and Dolan challenges)).
126. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 613 (2013).
127. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1082-83 (“[H]ere the Ordinance’s requirement of a monetary
payment is directly linked to a property owner’s desire to change the use of a specific,
identifiable unit of property.”).
128. See David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use
Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 48-51 (2014); Glen Hansen, Let’s Be Reasonable: Why
Neither Nollan/Dolan nor Penn Central Should Govern Generally-Applied Legislative
Exactions After Koontz, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2017). Prior to Koontz, some
scholars contended that the Court had effectively already deemed the legislative-
administrative distinction irrelevant given that the exactions at issue in Nollan and Dolan
are themselves most appropriately classified as legislative exactions. See J. David Breemer,
What Property Rights: The California Coastal Commission's History of Abusing Land Rights
and Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 265 (2004)
(discussing Dolan and Nollan); Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions:
Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 513, 539-40 (1995) (discussing Dolan);
Kent, supra note 120, at 1861 (discussing Dolan); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last
Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1040-41 (1997)
(discussing Dolan); Deborah M. Rosenthal, Commentary, Nollan, Dolan and the Legislative
Exception, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 4-5 (discussing Dolan, Nollan, and Koontz). For a particu-
larly thorough discussion on the Dolan Court classifying the exaction before it as “adjudi-
cative,” see Stephen M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Constitutionality
of Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 689, 720 n.172
(1995) (explaining that while city policy required only that developers provide “sufficient open
space”—a legislatively stated aim that officials met by determining in individual cases the
amount and location of the land to be dedicated—the Supreme Court found constitutionally
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question undecided in Koontz has since been confirmed doctrinally
by five Justices who participated in the case. The four-Justice dis-
sent in Koontz—authored by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor—claimed that the majority had
left open whether Nollan and Dolan scrutiny applied to legislative
exactions,129 and Justice Thomas—who joined the Koontz majority—
later corroborated this claim. In a statement concurring in the
denial of certiorari in California Building Industry Ass’n, Justice
Thomas wrote: “Until we decide this issue, property owners and lo-
cal governments are left uncertain about what legal standard
governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can legislatively
impose exactions that would not pass muster if done administra-
tively.”130
Second, in Levin, Judge Breyer justified applying Nollan and
Dolan by pointing to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Horne v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agriculture, which had applied Nollan and Dolan to a
marketing order that required raisin growers to deliver to the state
a certain percentage of their crop so that the state could keep the
market afloat.131 However, Horne did not discuss Koontz or raise the
legislative-administrative distinction in any capacity. More threat-
ening to this doctrinal analogy, though, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s Horne decision after Judge Breyer decided Levin
in 2014, concluding—for better or for worse—that the case involved
not a traditional regulatory takings or exaction takings claim, but
a physical takings claim.132
Given the doctrinal developments since Levin, one might expect
that Judge Breyer would have reacted accordingly moving forward.
infirm not the amount or location of the dedication required of Dolan, but the legislative
requirement that Dolan and other applicants dedicate any land at all (quoting Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2314 (1994))).
129. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 628 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the Court means in the
future to curb the intrusion into local affairs that its holding will accomplish.... The majority
might, for example, approve the rule, adopted in several States, that Nollan and Dolan apply
only to permitting fees that are imposed ad hoc, and not to fees that are generally applicable
.... Maybe today’s majority opinion accepts that distinction; or then again, maybe not.”).
130. 136 S. Ct. 928, 928-29 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
131.  See 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433-36 (2015).
132. See id. For an especially insightful critique of Horne’s conclusion that the regulation
at issue should be subjected to a physical takings analysis, see Lynda L. Butler, The Horne
Dilemma: Protecting Property's Richness and Frontiers, 75 MD. L. REV. 787 (2016).
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Surprisingly, though, he continued on the course he charted in
Levin in a separate case after Justice Thomas issued his concur-
rence in the denial of certiorari in California Building Industry
Ass’n and the Supreme Court decided Horne. In his November 2016
decision in Ophca, LLC v. City of Berkeley, Judge Breyer, without
explanation, subjected to a facial Nollan and Dolan challenge a gen-
erally applicable ordinance requiring payment of an impact fee to
offset the loss of affordable housing from the demolition of resi-
dential buildings.133
The City of San Francisco ultimately repealed and redrafted the
ordinance at issue in Levin and therefore voluntarily agreed with
the plaintiffs to dismiss its appeal. Though Judge Breyer denied the
city’s motion to vacate the district court’s judgment in light of this
settlement, it appears that the doctrinal arguments on which Levin
and Ophca rested are no longer in play.
Several pre-Koontz lower court cases—most often the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford
Estates134 and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Homebuilders
Ass’n of Dayton and Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek135—
regularly are attributed by jurists and scholars alike with having
rejected the legislative-administrative distinction in a matter akin
133. No. 16-CV-3046CRB, 2016 WL 6679560, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016). Judge Breyer
rejected this facial claim on the merits, on the ground that there were conceivable applications
of the ordinance that would comply with Nollan and Dolan, unlike, in his view, any applica-
tions of the ordinance at issue in Levin (which he had deemed facially unconstitutional). Id.
at *4. He found the Ophca claimants’ applied challenge as unripe, since city officials had not
yet calculated the fee for their respective development projects. Id. Three courts did not
discuss the threshold issue of whether to distinguish legislative from administrative exactions
and moved directly to the question of whether Nollan and Dolan scrutiny is applicable to
facial, as well as as-applied, challenges. Two of these three courts declined to apply Nollan
and Dolan to facial challenges of legislative exactions. See Koontz Coal. v. City of Seattle, No.
C14-0218JLR, 2014 WL 5384434 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2014) (involving an ordinance re-
quiring the payment of “in lieu” fees where development will exceed footprint authorized in
zoning code); Olympic Stewardship Found. v. State, 399 P.3d 562 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017)
(involving an ordinance requiring coastal development to respect a 150 foot shoreline buffer
and provide public access easements). The other case involved an as-applied challenge that
the court denied on the merits. See Webster Assocs., LLC v. Cromwell Planning and Zoning
Comm'n, No. CV146055771, 2015 WL 10353111 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2018) (involving an
ordinance conditioning subdivision permits to reduce lot sizes on preservation of a percentage
of each subdivided parcel for open space).
134. 71 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App. 2002), aff’d, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
135. 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000).
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to Judge Breyer’s opinions in Levin and Ophca.136 In dissenting from
the denial of certiorari in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City
of San Jose in 2016, Justice Thomas pointed to Homebuilders Ass’n
of Dayton as evidence of a lower court conflict that “shows no signs
of abating.”137 However, the claim that a lower court conflict exists
is, at best, remarkably overstated. 
Consider, first, Town of Flower Mound.138 The case involved two
local ordinances.139 The first required developers to assure that
streets abutting residential subdivisions conform to minimum
safety standards,140 which included, among others, the requirement
that adjacent and connector streets be constructed with concrete.141
The Town approved a 247-unit site plan submitted by a develop-
ment company, Stafford Estates, on the condition that the company
fund the replacement of the asphalt on an adjacent street with con-
crete.142 The second ordinance authorized the Town to grant excep-
tions to its street standards in instances of developer hardship.143
The Town denied Stafford’s request for such an exception in this
instance.144 Stafford objected to the condition throughout the permit-
ting process and, after obtaining its plat approvals and completing
136. See Wake & Bona, supra note 3, at 556-57 n.102; Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making
It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 532,
560 (2008); Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the
Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 725,
740-41 n.126 (2007).
137. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari).
138. 71 S.W.3d 18 (2002).
139. Id. at 24.
140. Id. at 24-25 n.1 (“Section 4.04(o) [sic] provides as follows ... Where a subdivision or
industrial area abuts a street that does not meet the minimum design standards of this
section, the following shall apply. (1) Local and collector streets. Abutting substandard local
and collector streets shall be constructed or reconstructed as necessary by the developer to
bring them up to minimum standards, and all right-of-way from the centerline of such road-
way necessary to meet minimum right-of-way requirements dedicated to the Town, with no
cost participation from the Town. The Federal Government, the State of Texas, and political
subdivisions of the State of Texas may be exempt from the provisions of this requirement.”).
141. Id. at 24 (citing section 4.04(b)).
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id. at 25 n.2 (“The Town Council may grant an exception to the street design
standards as contained in this section, provided that the Council finds and determines that
such standards work a hardship on the basis of utility relocation costs, right-of-way
acquisition costs, and other related factors.” (quoting section 4.04(a))).
144. Id. at 25.
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the asphalt-to-concrete improvements, filed an exaction takings
claim against the Town.145
In dicta, the Texas Supreme Court asserted that while “an ad hoc
decision is more likely to constitute a taking than general legisla-
tion,”146 a government entity conceivably “could ‘gang up’ on par-
ticular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents
would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would
otherwise bear were shifted to others.”147 However, the court did not
find it necessary to reach a decision on the legislative-administra-
tive distinction.148 Instead, it found that the second ordinance
operated to make the Town’s implementation of the first ordinance
administrative in nature, in that it required the Town to take into
account the development company’s individual circumstances in
considering the company’s request for an exception.149 For this rea-
son, the court concluded that there was “no meaningful distinction
between the conditions imposed on Stafford and the conditions
145. The Town unsuccessfully argued that, on public policy grounds, Stafford should be
precluded from suing after obtaining its development approval and rebuilding Simmons Road.
Id. at 25. Town of Flower Mound, and an appellate decision based thereon, Sefzik v. City of
McKinney, 198 S.W.3d 884, 894 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that landowner signing a “Facilities
Agreement” with the government did not bar a later takings claim), apparently are
distinguishable from Rischon Development Corp. v. City of Keller, where the court dismissed
a takings suit in which the claimant did not raise objections until after the government
granted the requested approval and he signed a developer agreement with the government.
242 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Tex. App. 2007).
146. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004).
147. Id. at 641. One year after Town of Flower Mound, the Texas Legislature codified
certain parts of the decision and modified or expanded others. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 212.904 (West 2005) (legislative history available at www.capitol.state.tx.us under House
Bill 1835 (79th Leg.-2005)). While the statute alters certain aspects of Flower Mound, namely
the timing of a “rough proportionality” analysis and the recoverability of attorney’s fees upon
certain successful exaction takings claims, it does not shed any light on the legislative-
administrative distinction. See Susan Alleman et al., Platting and Proportionality: A Prac-
tical Look at Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Sec. 212.904, Address at 2010 Land Use Conference (Mar.
25-26, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.wcglaw.com/assets/docs/publications/
Platting% 20and%20Proportionality.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KP-995R]).
148. Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 642 (stating that “we need not and do not
decide” the issue).
149. Id. at 641-42; see also Hansen, supra note 128, at 272 (suggesting that Nollan and
Dolan should apply where administrators exercise “substantial discretion” to “subjectively
exempt[ ]” individual applicants from otherwise broadly applicable requirements).
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imposed on Dolan and the Nollans,” such that the heightened
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan applied.150
Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton involved a generally applicable
roadway impact fee ordinance.151 The court confusingly asserted
that the “dual rational nexus test ... based on the Nollan and Dolan
cases” applied.152 It required that the state demonstrate a “rational
nexus”—or, as the court would later describe it, a “reasonable rela-
tionship”—between both (a) “the city’s interest in constructing new
roadways and the increase in traffic generated by new develop-
ments,” and (b) “the impact fee imposed by [the city] and the
benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new
roadways.”153 This course diverts from that charted in Nollan and
Dolan in two important ways. First, Nollan and Dolan are con-
cerned not with the benefits that might incur from the exaction to
the applicant’s benefit, but instead with whether the exaction is
connected to, and does no more than offset, the harms the approved
development will impose.154 Second, the “rational nexus”/“reasonable
relationship” standard employed by the Ohio court is one Dolan
explicitly rejected as too lenient.155 Indeed, in applying this test, the
Ohio court specifically relieved the city from having to conduct the
individualized determination that Dolan commands.156 As the
150. See Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641. At least one Texas appellate court has
incorrectly interpreted Flower Mound as rejecting the legislative-administrative distinction
wholesale. See Mira Mar Dev. Corp. v. City of Coppell, 364 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App. 2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 412 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App. 2013). At issue in Mira Mar was a City
of Coppell ordinance that (i) compelled the dedication of one acre of land per 100 developed
dwelling units for use as a public park, or (ii) required a set fee per dwelling unit in lieu
thereof (to be earmarked for the purchase of park property nearby) when development will
result in fewer than 100 residential units. Id. at 386. An appellate court subjected Coppell’s
in lieu fee to a Dolan analysis; ironically, the City had significantly reduced the in lieu fee for
this particular claimant. Id. at 386-87. The court also subjected to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny
the City’s application of a similar tree preservation ordinance and a water-bacteria testing
ordinance. Id. at 387-88 (“The City did not show that the removal of trees in the development
would harm the air quality, increase noise and glare, remove ecosystems, bring down property
values, or reduce the other benefits of trees described in the ordinance.”); id. at 390. 
151. 729 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ohio 2000).
152. Id. at 356.
153. Id.
154. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1986).
155. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
156. Id. (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
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Oregon Supreme Court would later remark on Homebuilders Ass’n
of Dayton, the Ohio Supreme Court “did not seem to adhere to [the
Nollan and Dolan] test in its analysis,” for it “made no individual-
ized assessment of proportionality at all but instead reviewed the
legislation from a facial perspective as it applied to developers
generally.”157
3. Summary
There are some pragmatic considerations that suggest caution in
recognizing the legislative-administrative distinction in the ex-
actions context. For one, doing so could trigger a marked shift in
land use policy toward inflexible legislative measures to avoid the
heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.158 This shift could have
serious social implications, for administrative acts are more ame-
nable to addressing the heterogeneous impacts of a given develop-
ment project and affording important attention to the affected
parties’ personal, social, political, and economic identities.159 For
another, while current condemnation and regulatory takings
jurisprudence afford broad deference to both legislative and ad-
ministrative acts, conceiving of administrative acts in the exactions
context as constitutionally suspect could have “spillover effects” in
the myriad condemnation and regulatory takings contexts involving
administrative acts unrelated to exactions.160 On the whole, though,
the foregoing analysis suggests that it is rather unsurprising that
most every jurisdiction to have addressed the issue in the exactions
context recognizes the legislative-administrative distinction in at
least some regard.161
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
157. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 978 n.13 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
158. Mulvaney, supra note 31, at 142.
159. Id.; see also Nolon, supra note 93, at 570 (praising “contingency bargaining” for its
ability to “accommodate uncertainty in ways that regulation cannot”).
160. Mulvaney, supra note 31, at 141.
161. At least three circuit courts (the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth) and state courts in ten states
(Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Washington,
and Wisconsin) have recognized the distinction. See Alto Eldorado v. County of Santa Fe, 634
F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
2008); Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir.
1996); Harris v. Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994); Home Builders Ass’n of Cent.
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Select cases beyond Town of Flower Mound and Homebuilders
Ass’n of Dayton arguably could be interpreted as supporting the
legislative-administrative distinction.162 However, the insinuation
that there was a fairly even split across the lower courts pre-Koontz
is unsupportable, and Koontz, to date, has not prompted lower
courts to alter course.
C. “Concrete and Specific” Demands
1. Issue
The majority and dissent in Koontz agreed that the Nollan and
Dolan standards apply not only when the state actually imposes
subject conditions through an issued permit, but also when the state
denies a permit application after proposing such conditions to which
the applicant refuses to accede.163 However, Koontz explained that
proposed exactions only trigger Nollan and Dolan review where they
Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999-1000 (Ariz. 1997); Home Builders Ass’n of N.
Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 65-66 (Ct. App. 2001); Krupp v. Breckenridge San-
itation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001); Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colorado Springs, 207
P.3d 875, 880-81 (Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 220 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2009); Greater Atlanta Home-
builders Ass’n v. DeKalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2003); Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City
of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552
N.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); W. Linn Corp. Park v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d
29, 45 (Or. 2010); Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Home-
builders Ass’n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 408-
10 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006); Wis.
Builders Ass’n v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 702 N.W.2d 433, 446-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) (asserting that the leg-
islative nature of an exaction is just one factor in determining whether the Nollan and Dolan
tests apply).
162. See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994); B.A.M. Dev.,
LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 714-15 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187, 194-95 (Wash. 1994).
163. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 607 (2013) (“Extortionate
demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not
because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have
property taken without just compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in
which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the
impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.”); see
id. at 619-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the
government approves a development permit conditioned on the owner's conveyance of a prop-
erty interest (i.e., imposes a condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a
permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition precedent).”).
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reflect a sufficiently “concrete and specific ... demand.”164 Justice
Alito’s majority opinion noted that the Florida Supreme Court had
not reached this question of “whether respondent issued a demand
of sufficient concreteness to trigger” Nollan and Dolan review.165 He
explained that, therefore, the Court had “no occasion to consider
how concrete and specific a demand must be to give rise to liability
under Nollan and Dolan.”166 Justice Alito wrote that “the issue re-
mains open on remand for the Florida Supreme Court to address.”167
2. Movement Post-Koontz
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately remanded the matter to
the state appellate court.168 Puzzlingly, the appellate court did not
address whether the state had issued a concrete and specific
demand.169 Instead, it simply “reaffirm[ed]” its original decision that
Koontz is entitled to just compensation for an unconstitutional
taking on the grounds that “[t]he constitutional issues decided by
the United States Supreme Court were fully briefed here, and that
Court's holding does not set forth a new legal construct with which
we must re-analyze these issues.”170 The threshold problem with the
appellate court’s conclusion—that all nine Justices on the Supreme
Court agreed that no compensable taking had occurred here—will
be addressed in the discussion on remedies below.171 The more spe-
cific problem, on which this Section concentrates, is that, in Koontz,
the Supreme Court for the first time deemed Nollan and Dolan ap-
plicable to the subset of proposed demands that are sufficiently con-
crete and specific. Whether one terms this a “new legal construct”
164. Id. at 610 (majority opinion); see also id. at 619 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (questioning
“whether the government here imposed any condition at all”); id. at 621 (“St. Johns River
Water Management District ... never demanded anything (including money) in exchange for
a permit.”).
165. See also id. at 610 (majority opinion) (finding it unnecessary to address the State’s
claim that “its demands for property were too indefinite to give rise to liability under Nollan
and Dolan”).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See infra Part II.D.
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or not, the concrete and specificity question seems one on which
every court addressing a proposed exaction claim must opine mov-
ing forward absent a state concession on the point.
Contrary to the Floridian appellate court’s decision on remand in
Koontz, a Delaware court recently attended to the issue of the
concreteness and specificity of a state demand in Golf Course
Associates v. New Castle County.172 The Golf Course Associates court
asserted that Koontz “can only be read as acknowledging the
necessity of a demand; otherwise there would be no need to remand
for a determination of whether it was of ‘sufficient concreteness to
trigger the special protections of Nollan and Dolan.’”173 In this case,
a development company realized that its subdivision would create
a traffic problem, so it offered to fund a $1.1 million improvement
project.174 Under the county’s development code, the county could
not approve a “Record Plan” of development without assuring that
infrastructure necessary to support the proposed development al-
ready existed or would exist by the time the development project is
completed.175 In this regard, the code required an applicant to sub-
mit a traffic impact study, on which the state’s Department of
Transportation would provide comments to the county.176 Here, the
Department of Transportation concluded that the proposed develop-
ment would not meet the county’s development code “level of
service” standards without a $3.5 million improvement project.177 It
consented, though, to accept the applicant’s offered $1.1 million con-
tribution toward that $3.5 million project if and when the state ever
undertook it.178 The county then denied the company’s subdivision
permit application because the traffic issue was not definitively
resolved.179
172. No. 15A-02-007JAP, 2016 WL 1425367, at *16-17 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2016).
173. Id. at *16 (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 610
(2013)). The court continued, “The proposition that there must be a ‘demand’ is reinforced by
the Koontz majority’s repeated references to the extortionate nature of the government’s
demand.... These repeated references to extortion are pertinent here because they demon-
strate that a demand is essential to an unconstitutional exactions claim.” Id. at *16-17.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id. at *1-2.
176. Id. at *3-4.
177. Id. at *4.
178. Id. 
179. Id. at *5.
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The company alleged that the state agency’s preference for the
more expensive maybe-we-will-construct-it improvement, though
not requiring additional monies from the company, constituted an
exaction taking.180 While the company did not frame it in these
terms, its claim seemingly rested on the following logic: (1) the state
asserted that it would only charge the applicant $1.1 million of the
anticipated $3.5 million in development impacts, though only if the
state decided in the future that it would allow the development and
mitigate this harm, and (2) the state thereby implied that, if the
company wanted the permit now, it must pay $3.5 million.181
In an opinion that an appellate panel later adopted in full,182 a
trial court judge held that the county had not made a “concrete and
specific” demand that could be subjected to a Nollan and Dolan
analysis.183 There are at least two justifications for the Delaware
court declining to deem the state as having issued a concrete and
specific demand in this scenario. First, judicial speculation on what
state conversations with applicants imply poses a wholly unman-
ageable system that could require courts to review countless cases
that do not present actual controversies.184 Second, burdening
governmental entities with possible takings liability for assumed
implications will place a chilling effect on regulator-landowner
coordination.185
180. Id. at *6.
181. See generally id.
182. Golf Course Assocs. v. New Castle County, 152 A.3d 581, 581 (Del. 2016) (“[I]t appears
to the Court that the judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of and
for the reasons assigned in its decision.” (referring to Golf Course Assocs., 2016 WL 1425367)).
183. Golf Course Assocs., 2016 WL 1425367, at *16-18. 
184. For a fuller recitation of this rationale, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions,
26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 304-05 (2011). 
185. See id. at 308-12. In the only other lower court case to broach the issue since Koontz,
Koontz’s holding on the concreteness and specificity of a proposed exaction actually came back
to haunt a property owner-applicant. Talismanic Props., LLC v. Tipp City, 309 F. Supp. 3d
501, 509-10 (S.D. Ohio 2017), aff’d, No. 18-3036, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21129 (6th Cir. July
31, 2018). After negotiating with city officials, the developer agreed to pay the city more than
$140,000 for an electrical extension to its proposed subdivision, and these officials agreed on
behalf of the city to approve the developer’s “final plan” application. Id. at 505-06. In the first
of two lawsuits, the developer sought reversal of the city’s decision to reject an ordinance that
would have finalized that agreement. Id. at 506. In settling that lawsuit, the city reversed
course and approved the ordinance. Id. After receiving permission for its final plan via the
settlement, the developer sought to challenge that permission’s condition—the $140,000
electrical extension fee—as an exaction taking in a second lawsuit. Id. at 506-07. The court
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3. Summary
While it is possible that the lower courts will follow the Florida
appellate court’s peculiar course of papering over Koontz’s requiring
a “concrete and specific” demand to trigger exaction takings re-
view,186 for the reasons discussed in this Section, it seems probable
that, like the Delaware appellate court in the Golf Course Associates
case, the lower courts will explore whether the requirement is met
in a given context.187 
D. Remedies
1. Issue
The Supreme Court explained in Koontz that, because the District
never granted the permit with what the Court deemed an unconsti-
tutional condition, nothing had been taken from the claimant.188 In
turn, the remedy mandated by the Fifth Amendment for takings
(just compensation) did not apply.189 The Court asserted, instead,
that “[i]n cases where there is an excessive demand but no taking,
whether money damages are available is not a question of federal
constitutional law but of the cause of action—whether state or
federal—on which the landowner relies.”190 It thus declared that it
had “no occasion” to discuss what remedy might be available to
Koontz, given that he brought his claim pursuant to a state stat-
utory cause of action.191
held that this claim was barred because the developer should have raised it when she filed
the first lawsuit, for by that time the concrete and specific demand already had been proposed
in a written and binding form. Id. at 509-10 (“Because the City's demand predated Plaintiffs'
execution of the electrical extension agreement on August 30, 2013, and Plaintiffs' first
lawsuit was commenced approximately one year later in August 2014, the undersigned
concludes that Plaintiffs could have, in the first lawsuit, sought just compensation for a taking
arising from the City's allegedly excessive fee demand.”).
186. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
188. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 608-09 (2013).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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This declaration is difficult to square with Koontz’s complaint.
The statute on which Koontz relied allows property owners to seek
“damages” where a state entity acts in a manner that reflects “an
unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a
taking without just compensation.”192 Florida takings law is quite
similar to federal takings law,193 and the Supreme Court here decid-
ed that, under federal constitutional law, nothing had been taken
from Koontz.194 Therefore, it seemingly follows that because no ex-
ercise of the state’s police power here constituted a taking without
just compensation, a damages remedy necessarily is unavailable to
Koontz under his state law cause of action.
Interestingly, the Koontz dissenters asserted that they agreed
with the majority that a condition violative of Nollan and Dolan
should be enjoined, even though the majority reached no such
explicit conclusion.195 No Justice said any more about remedies. In
this space, proponents of strong takings protections expressed
optimism that Koontz could kick-start an expansion of the remedies
available in exaction takings cases. For instance, Steven Eagle
wrote that “[w]hen providing remedies for its new Koontz doctrine
of imposing unreasonable burdens on Takings Clause rights, the
Court has the opportunity for a new beginning. It could provide for
injunctive relief against demands for unreasonable exactions ... with
damages for the time the burden was in force.”196 Richard Epstein
echoed Eagle’s view in noting that “[a]t the very least, a landowner
... should recover damages for economic losses attributable to what
is [a] temporary taking of land given that no development could take
place.”197
192. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2019) (emphasis added).
193. See Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890 F.3d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“Because Florida follows federal takings law, we can look to cases brought under the Fifth
Amendment to inform our analysis.”).
194. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 612.
195. Id. at 620 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
196. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion, supra note 3, at 31. In Koontz itself, the state actually
relented on requiring any permit condition at all well before the matter reached the Supreme
Court. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 5, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570
U.S. 595 (2013) (No. 11-1447). The landowner’s claim before the Supreme Court, therefore,
effectively concentrated on the delay in receiving that unconditioned permit.
197. See Richard Epstein, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District: Of Issues
Resolved—and Shoved Under the Table, POINTOFLAW.COM (June 26, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://
www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-water-management-district-of-
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2. Movement Post-Koontz
On remand, the Florida appellate court asserted that “[t]he un-
derpinning of Koontz's claim is clearly the Takings Clause.”198 Yet
it declined to reopen the briefing and reinstated its earlier holding
that “the District had effected a taking” for which it owed just com-
pensation even though the Supreme Court decided in Koontz that
nothing had been taken.199 The appellate court reached this holding
despite the fact that the violation the Supreme Court had found—an
unconstitutional condition that did not amount to a taking—is not
one for which Florida’s statute awards damages.200
Beyond the puzzling Koontz remand,201 the claimant has pre-
vailed in just two of the seven post-Koontz exaction takings cases
decided on the “nexus” and “proportionality” merits.202 In these two
instances, neither federal district court judge followed the course for
which the likes of Eagle and Epstein had called. Rather, while these
judges enjoined the imposition of what they deemed unconsti-
tutional conditions,203 they did not require compensation for the pe-
riod in which those conditions were in force or order issuance of
issues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php [https://perma.cc/GWL2-7CMJ]; see also
Thomas Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1662 (2015)
(suggesting that proposed exaction takings cases akin to Koontz should be resolved “through
an anticipatory declaration of rights”).
198. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (citing Koontz, 570 U.S. at 607).
199. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009),
decision quashed, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev'd, 570 U.S. 595.
200. See Koontz, 183 So. 3d at 396, 398 n.2.
201. Id.
202. See Cheatham v. City of Hartselle, No. CV-14-J-397-NE, 2015 WL 897583, at *4-5
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) (holding that a city conditioning a subdivision permit on addressing
traffic concerns of a proposed development met the essential nexus test because of a likely
increase in traffic, but failed on rough proportionality because the court could only consider
the impacts of a small single-home carve out—which was the only part of the proposed
development requiring approval—and not the subdivision as a whole); Levin v. City & County
of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (striking down an ordinance
requiring all landlords who withdraw rent-controlled properties from the rental market to pay
their displaced tenants two years’ worth of the difference between rent-controlled and market
rents—which they presumably would but need not put towards relocation costs—but leaving
open the possibility of conditioning withdrawal of rent-controlled properties on more specific
relocation costs clearly caused by the withdrawal).
203. Cheatham, 2015 WL 897583, at *6; Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1089. 
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unconditional permits.204 Instead, they left it to the state to de-
termine whether to issue a new conditional permit that survived
Nollan and Dolan.205
3. Summary
The remedies available to a claimant who prevails in an uncon-
stitutional conditions suit predicated on a failure to meet the exac-
tion takings standards of Nollan and Dolan is not entirely clear.
However, the limited number of post-Koontz cases to have reached
the remedies issue thus far have rebuffed any expansion-minded
efforts.
E. Summary: Potential Extensions Inside the Exaction Takings
Context
This Part has suggested that, contrary to the predictions set out
by many takings observers in Koontz’s immediate wake, the case’s
footprint on exaction takings doctrine in the lower courts has been
quite light to date. By and large, the lower courts citing Koontz have
narrowly interpreted the class of monetary impositions and “con-
crete and specific” demands that are subject to Nollan and Dolan
scrutiny; refused to extend Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to permit
conditions stemming from broadly applicable legislation; and, in
204. Cheatham, 2015 WL 897583, at *6; Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1088-89.
205. The five cases to have cited Koontz in which courts found no exaction taking on the
merits include Ophca, LLC v. City of Berkeley, No. 16-cv-3046 CRB, 2016 WL 6679560, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016); White Oak Realty v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. A16-1937, 2016 WL
4799101, at *7-8 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) aff’d, No. 17-30438, 2018 WL 340991 (5th Cir. July
11, 2018); Pointe SDMU LP v. County of San Diego, No. DO66888, 2016 WL 3960075, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 2016); Powell v. County of Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 762 (Ct.
App. 2014); Webster Assocs. v. Cromwell Planning and Zoning Comm'n, No. CV146055771,
2015 WL 10353111, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2015). In Harstad v. City of Woodbury,
the applicant argued that the city could not condition her permit on a certain fee because the
State had not delegated that power to the city. 902 N.W.2d 64, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d,
916 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 2018). She alleged a temporary taking for the period in which that
condition was in force, relying on Koontz for the idea that Nollan and Dolan apply to proposed
conditions even if those conditions are never imposed and thus nothing is actually taken. Id.
at 69. The court deemed the conclusion that the city had no authority to impose the condition
as mooting a temporary takings claim. Id. at 75-76. The case, therefore, does not decide but
does suggest that temporary takings compensation is not owed where a permit condition is
enjoined for violating Nollan and Dolan. See id.
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those narrow instances in which Nollan and Dolan scrutiny is
applicable, limited the remedies available to successful claimants.
III. IN THE WAKE OF KOONTZ: POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS 
OUTSIDE THE EXACTIONS CONTEXT
The prior Part explored several incremental extensions that
takings scholars projected Koontz might initiate in the exactions
context, including interpreting broadly the class of monetary impo-
sitions that are subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny;206 applying
Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to permit conditions imposed not only
through individualized administrative decisions but also to those
imposed via broadly applicable legislation;207 construing broadly the
class of proposed conditions deemed “concrete and specific” enough
to implicate Nollan and Dolan;208 and enhancing the remedies avail-
able in exaction takings cases.209 This Part takes on a more ambi-
tious projection offered by select scholars in Koontz’s immediate
wake, namely that courts would extend Nollan and Dolan scrutiny
outside the permit condition context altogether and into govern-
ment contracts and other more traditional realms of regulatory tak-
ings law.
A. Issue
One analyst described Koontz as “represent[ing] a positive devel-
opment in the trend towards [making] landowner challenges to land
use restrictions more amenable to judicial review.”210 Another
suggested that Koontz “could turn out to be the most important
property rights victory in the Supreme Court in some time.”211 A
third went so far as to contend that Koontz is “likely to have as
much impact within the sphere of local government law and tak-
ings jurisprudence” as prominent recent rulings on affirmative ac-
tion in university admissions, the validity of preclearance provisions
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. See supra Part II.C.
209. See supra Part II.D.
210. See Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion, supra note 3, at 30.
211. See Somin, supra note 3, at 216.
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of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and same-gender marriage will in
the “civil rights arena.”212
B. Movement Post-Koontz
Four post-Koontz cases in the lower courts have addressed direct-
ly the issue of extending Nollan and Dolan scrutiny outside the
permit condition context. Of the four, one declined to apply Nollan
and Dolan to conditions set out in a government contract.213 The
other three declined to extend Nollan and Dolan to other non-
permitting contexts, including state decisions denying a request to
remove a floodway designation,214 assigning abatement costs to a
landowner handling solid waste without prior authorization,215 and
charging insurers a fee to support a state insurance exchange even
if they did not sell policies on the exchange.216
212. See Stadnyk, supra note 3, at 4.
213. White Oak Realty v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. A16-1937, 2016 WL 4799101, at
*1 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016). The government contracted with landowners who were willing
to provide fill materials for post-Hurricane Katrina levee enforcement, but required
mitigation when removing the fill materials would harm forests or wetlands. Id. at *1, *7
(“The issue is whether the per se takings analysis used in Dolan, Nollan, and Koontz should
be extended to apply to conditions set forth by contract, rather than in land use permits.
Plaintiffs have not provided this Court with any case using a per se takings analysis when the
condition at issue was contractual. Accordingly, this Court declines to extend the per se tak-
ings analysis to this matter.”).
214. See Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland County, 776 S.E.2d 900, 902 (S.C. 2015). The
plaintiff bought a large lot and then challenged the state’s failure to remove a floodway
designation so that he could develop the tract. Id. at 902-03; see id. at 912 n.19 (“This case in
no manner falls within the exactions line of cases, as Richland County has not required
Columbia Venture to grant an easement or dedicate a portion of its property for public use.”).
215. See ABC Holdings, Inc. v. Kittitas County, 348 P.3d 1222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). The
city imposed a fine and abatement costs on a chemical company for handling solid waste
without a permit. Id. at 1225. The appellate court asserted: 
[T]he Koontz holding applies solely in the context of the land use permit process
where a government approval was conditioned on coercively compelling a
landowner to give up property. Our case is distinguished from Koontz because
it concerns regulatory permit enforcement and does not compel a landowner to
give up property.
Id. at 1129 (internal citation omitted).
216. Am. Council of Life Insurers v. D.C. Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 73 F. Supp. 3d 65,
72-73, 96-99 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to a fee that insurers were
required to pay to support a state insurance exchange even if they did not sell policies on the
exchange).
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These courts’ hesitancy is well founded. Extending Nollan and
Dolan outside the permitting context would subject the state to a
flood of challenges to even the most common land use controls,
including zoning and building code regulations, which a large major-
ity of owners and nonowners alike support.217 Even if the bulk of
these controls were to survive such challenges, the very existence of
a legal platform to assert them would impose inordinate costs,
especially on the smallest of government entities, such that a mas-
sive reduction in such controls seems the only fiscally possible
result.218 While such a course might well come with the benefit of
eliminating those land use controls that ingrain prejudices and
breed exclusivity, it would work as a hammer to serve this interest
at the expense of many others when a scalpel would more prudently
do.219 
Oregon’s experience with the infamous Measure 37 bears this out.
In passing this ballot initiative in 2004, the State’s voters openly
encouraged the nonenforcement of land use restrictions.220 The law
asserted, in relevant part: “If a public entity ... enforces [most any]
land use regulation ... that restricts the use of private real property
... and has the effect of reducing the fair market value of the prop-
erty ... the owner ... shall be paid just compensation.”221 The law op-
erated to modify the substance of all land use restrictions subject to
it by directing municipalities not to enforce those restrictions if it
did not plan to pay compensation for the economic diminution in
property values resulting from their enforcement.222 In just three
years, more than seven thousand claims had been filed against
municipal governments223 seeking a total of seventeen billion dollars
217. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 288, 299-300, 331, 351-52.
218. Id. at 351.
219. Id. at 352.
220. OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., BALLOT MEASURES 37 (2004) AND 49
(2007) OUTCOME AND EFFECTS 34 (2011), https://www.oregon.gov/lcd/Measure49/Documents/
M49_BallotMeasures37_and_49_OutcomesEffects_2011.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8UB-
8HJC].
221. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352(1) (2005) (emphasis added) (current version at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 195.305(1) (2015)).
222. See Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2016).
223. Id.
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in compensation.224 These local governments found no viable fiscal
option but to forego enforcement of regulations on zoning, subdivi-
sion, farming and forestry practices, transportation, and the like
that allegedly diminished property values.225
Interest in passing an initiative such as Measure 37—much like
interest in extending Nollan and Dolan outside of the permitting
context—seems grounded in a particular conception of liberty intent
on siphoning out as much state engagement in land use as possible.
Yet land use regulations are not exclusively pro-liberty or anti-
liberty.226 Rather, they secure certain individuals’ liberties against
new, undesirable uses of property that would infringe on those
liberties, though necessarily at the hefty expense of the liberty of
use of others.227
C. Summary
Similar to what occurred in the Measure 37 context, the massive
reduction in land use regulation that would result from extending
Nollan and Dolan outside the permitting context would thwart the
expectations of the very landowners whom the nexus and propor-
tionality standards were designed to protect.228 In such a world, the
Nollans’ neighbors could at any point poison the pristine oceanic
waters and vista on which the value of the Nollans’ land depends,
while neighbors of Florence Dolan’s hardware store and the strip
mall Coy Koontz planned to construct could engage in similarly
undesirable uses that make these business ventures far riskier
propositions than they were under the extant regime. That Oregon
property owners substantially reduced the impact of Measure 37 by
supporting another ballot initiative in 2007 serves as a cautious tale
for those optimistic about subjecting all or most land use regulations
to heightened judicial scrutiny.229 The post-Koontz cases to have
224. See OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., supra note 220, at 5.
225. Id. The claimants were using the market value that had been established, in part, by
a system of land use rules as the baseline from which they alleged any enforcement of that
system was causing their market value to decline. Id. at 34.
226. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 927-28.
227. Id.
228. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 351-52.
229. See id.
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faced requests to extend Nollan and Dolan outside the permit
conditions context have recognized as much.
CONCLUSION: THE STATE OF EXACTIONS
Modern regulatory takings law is best understood not as protect-
ing against value diminutions resulting from regulation but rather
“as a bulwark against unfairness.”230 In its well-known 1978 deci-
sion in Penn Central, the Supreme Court offered a nonexclusive list
of considerations that courts should take into account in attempting
to determine in an individual case whether an imposition stemming
from a new regulatory safeguard or obligation, as opposed to one
“concentrated on a few persons,” is fair and just absent compensa-
tion.231 These considerations include (1) “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regu-
lation has interfered with [the claimant’s] distinct investment-
backed expectations,” and (3) the “character of the governmental
action.”232 
While the goal of fairness and the considerations that Penn
Central suggested to advance this goal are of limited content in the
abstract, hundreds of Supreme Court and lower court takings cases
have given these goals and considerations meaning.233 This expan-
sive body of takings precedents has instructed that claimants
generally are not entitled to takings compensation for adhering to
generally applicable obligations that advance the public interest,234
safeguards that prevent owners from using their land in ways
harmful to others,235 or baseline standards for market and social
230. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 57 (1964).
231. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962)).
232. Id. at 124.
233. See, e.g., Mulvaney, supra note 226, at 953-56; Joseph William Singer, Justifying
Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 631-54 (2015).
234. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1927) (holding that a setback requirement did
not constitute a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80, 395-97
(1926) (holding that a zoning scheme did not constitute a taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S.
91, 103, 107-08 (1909) (holding that a statutory building height limit did not constitute a
taking).
235. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474-77, 500-02
(1987) (upholding a Pennsylvania regulation that limited how much subsurface coal could be
mined in order to protect surface structures); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
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interactions.236 In turn, these precedents suggest that takings com-
pensation is more likely in those rare situations in which the state
unjustifiably applies such obligations, safeguards, or relational
standards retroactively to existing, unharmful uses or isolates indi-
viduals among similarly situated persons to shoulder their wholly
disproportionate weight.237
This Article’s analysis suggests that the lower courts in most
instances have not seen Koontz as a launching pad to curtail this
broad authority on the state’s part to regulate land uses absent
compensation. The cases that have cited Koontz to date do little to
interfere with the state’s flexibility to draw on its suite of regulatory
tools to ensure that property rights are not exercised in ways that
harm either the legitimate property and personal rights of others,
or the economic and social infrastructure that facilitates wide
dispersal of the advantages of the property system.238
The analysis herein of the 130 lower court cases that have cited
Koontz to date indicates that application of Nollan’s and Dolan’s
“nexus” and “proportionality” standards generally has been confined
to a narrowly construed set of “concrete and specific,” ad hoc
demands that include a small subset of monetary impositions and
requirements to provide strangers permanent access to the permit
591-92, 595-96 (1962) (upholding a town regulation that prohibited excavation below the
water table, which in turn rendered petitioner’s quarry effectively useless); Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 309-10, 324-25 (1920) (upholding a statute conditioning the burning
of natural gas); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-05, 409-11 (1915) (upholding a
regulation that banned the operation of brick factories within Los Angeles’ city limits);
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1915) (upholding a regulation banning
livery stables from certain areas in the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 653, 675
(1887) (upholding a regulation that banned the production of alcohol for recreational pur-
poses); Powell v. Commonwealth, 7 A. 913, 914-16 (Pa. 1887) (upholding a law that outlawed
the production of oleomargarine).
236. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415-18, 445-48 (1934)
(upholding the constitutionality of a state mortgage moratorium law, which allowed courts
to extend the period of redemption for foreclosure sales); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-58
(1921) (holding that a rent control law, which regulated rent prices and allowed tenants to
stay in their apartments so long as they paid on time and satisfied any other conditions of the
lease, was not a taking).
237. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37-40 (2012) (holding
that the temporary nature of government-caused floods did not automatically preclude such
floods from constituting a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 166, 177-82 (1871).
238. Recognizing the value of the suite of regulatory tools as a whole, John Nolon explains
that “contingency bargaining” can facilitate “deals that accommodate uncertainty in ways that
[traditional] regulation cannot.” Nolon, supra note 93, at 570.
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applicant’s land.239 Moreover, it interprets this case law as design-
ing a narrow set of remedies for the rare successful claimant that
preserves the state’s continued flexibility to regulate land uses in
service of the public.240 The goal of the cases interpreting and
applying Koontz, like regulatory takings jurisprudence more
generally, is identifying only those most isolating and unjust of
impositions.241
These lower court cases respect the state’s unavoidable role in al-
locating property interests in the face of competing claims. Consider,
for instance, a building company’s claim, on the one hand, to the
benefits of a retaining wall to facilitate development on a given
parcel to which it holds title, and a neighbor’s claim, on the other
hand, to be secure against the harm that could ensue from that
retaining wall’s channeling water next door. The post-Koontz case
law recognizes that whether the state extends to the building
company the unfettered ability to construct that retaining wall,
imposes a permit condition that requires mitigation of the wall’s
external impacts, or prohibits construction of such a wall altogether,
the state cannot extract itself from having made an allocative choice
as to whether the affected neighbor’s property interest includes
security against the substantial harms that can result from nearby
alterations in water flow.242 Koontz may well prompt a sea change
239. See supra Parts II.A.-C. There is very little information—empirical or otherwise—on
the disposition of permit applications that do not reach the judicial system. See Eagle, Koontz
in the Mansion, supra note 3, at 24; Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in
the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995). Indeed, only a small collection of legal scholars
have begun to venture into this space. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45; Brett Christopher
Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Inter-
pretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 233 (1999);
Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for
Growth With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Rev. 177 (2006); Kristen P. Sosnosky, Note, Dolan v.
City of Tigard: A Sequel to Nollan's Essential Nexus Test for Regulatory Takings, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 1677 (1995). An in-depth future project in this regard would be a welcome contribution
to exaction takings law scholarship.
240. See supra Part II.D.
241. See supra Part II.E.
242. See Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph William Singer, Things Invisible to See: State Action
& Private Property, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 439, 487-88 (2018) (“Either an owner has the right
to eject a homeless person from his property or the homeless person has a right to enter the
property to save his life. The state cannot fail to act in cases like this; it must allocate the en-
titlement to someone and deny it to others; there is simply no space within which the state can
be said to not be acting.”). In this sense, the lower courts that have cited Koontz necessarily
2019] THE STATE OF EXACTIONS 221
in takings law that exerts constitutional pressure on some of the
allocative choices that are available to the state. But, at least per an
evaluation of the lower court decisions to date, signs of such a rev-
olutionary move fortunately are few and far between.
have had to disregard the Koontz Court’s claim that it was not making a normative judgment.
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 614-15 (2013) (“[I]t bears
emphasis that petitioner’s claim does not implicate ‘normative considerations about the
wisdom of government decisions.’” (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998))).
